Are DSGE models irreparably flawed?

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Abstract

In this paper we respond to the recent critique of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models. We present the most recent developments in the DSGE literature and show that it has gone a long way to accommodate many sources of criticism.

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1 Introduction

In a recent article Podkaminer (2021) postulates that Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models are seriously flawed and seem immanently irreparable. His main arguments are as follows:

(i) DSGE models counterfactually assume the existence of a representative agent and hence ignore heterogeneity,

(ii) DSGE models assume rational behavior of agents (including the formation of expectations) and hence ignore cognitive imperfections,

(iii) DSGE models ignore the existence of financial markets,

(iv) DSGE models ignore involuntary unemployment,

(v) solving a DSGE model involves linearization, which ignores important nonlinearities,

(vi) deriving models from microfoundations is not necessary (just like Newton did not derive his laws of dynamics from the behavior of elementary particles),

(vii) bringing DSGE models to data is flawed as it involves a fair amount of pure arbitrariness.

Our impression is that this narrative (and hence the critique of DSGE models) is largely based on the state of the art in DSGE modeling in the 1990s. Indeed, at that point in time DSGE models (Real Business Cycle, RBC; New Keynesian, NK) dominated the literature. They assumed representative agents with fully rational behavior, ignored the existence of financial market imperfections, were usually solved using linearization techniques (first-order perturbation) and brought to the data by calibration.

Over the last 25 years, however, much progress has occurred in all areas listed above (and several other which we do not discuss here, like the modeling of open-economy issues, unconventional monetary policy or, very recently, interactions between epidemics and the macroeconomy) and this paper intends to present these developments to the reader. Basic RBC or NK models nowadays have the status of quasi toy models and are used mainly for teaching purposes. At the same time, however, they form the backbone of more elaborate models which, e.g., by including additional frictions enable the study of phenomena for which the RBC or NK frameworks are not adequate.

In this paper we claim that:

▪ DSGE models are currently much more developed than it is suggested in Podkaminer (2021), many points of critique have been the subject of serious research over the last 25 years (part of which we discuss below).

▪ There are, nevertheless, areas where research and progress have, in our view, been insufficient (and more is needed). This includes, among others, a more serious treatment of microfoundations which should to a larger extent reflect developments in psychology and behavioral economics.

▪ Whether being microfounded or not, contemporaneous macroeconomic models are not able to describe the economic system perfectly – reality is simply too complex.

▪ Microfounded models have, however, the potential to explain how various aspects of human behavior affect macroeconomic outcomes. This is, in our view, the essence of economics, and this is why we believe that deriving models from microfoundations should remain an important building block of macroeconomic modeling.

▪ DSGE models are, however, only tools. For some applications they can be useful and provide valuable insight. For other applications different models are more appropriate. It is the role (and responsibility) of the researcher to choose the tool appropriately.

1 Similar concerns have been raised earlier, see e.g., Solow (2010) or Stiglitz (2018).
The rest of the article is structured as follows. We first briefly introduce DSGE models and explain why we believe that for many applications macroeconomic models should be derived from microeconomic behavior. Then we present recent developments in DSGE modeling regarding the introduction of heterogeneity, unemployment, non-rational behavior, financial frictions as well as solution and estimation techniques. Given how many topics we discuss we are, by necessity, relatively brief on each. It should be stated clearly and upfront that it is not our goal to present an extensive review of the existing literature. We deliberately choose to present selected positions which represent the development of DSGE models going much beyond the baseline representative agent RBC or NK models. For the interested Reader, however, we provide references which allow her or him to study the topics at hand more thoroughly.

2 DSGE models

Before we take the Reader through the most recent developments in modeling, we wish to briefly introduce the concept of DSGE models to those Readers who do not feel familiar with it and explain where we see their advantages over non-DSGE models.

DSGE stands for Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium and usually refers to a class of macroeconomic models in which:

– decision rules of agents (households, firms) are derived from explicit optimization problems at the microeconomic level (so called microfoundations),
– markets are assumed to clear (i.e., supply equals demand),
– fluctuations of the economy around a steady state (or a balanced growth path) are the consequence of random shocks hitting the economy.

These features can be used to decipher the acronym DSGE. “General equilibrium” refers to the situation when agents optimize their behavior and markets clear. “Stochastic” refers to the random source of economic fluctuations. “Dynamic” refers to the fact, that thus derived decision rules explain the propagation of the economy over time (for instance by relating today’s decisions to asset holdings accumulated yesterday). So much and only that much, as we will explain later.

This approach to constructing DSGE models has several consequences, which we see as their comparative advantage over non-DSGE models and which probably explain their popularity.

First, all variables, shocks and parameters have economic interpretations. This feature stands in sharp contrast to traditional macroeconomic or econometric models, where usually only the variables (and sometimes some parameters) have an economic interpretation. The economic interpretability of all these objects enables a thorough economic interpretation of economic developments, be it simulated or estimated. To name but one very useful application of DSGE models, historical data as well as forecasts can be decomposed into the impact of (interpretable) shocks. For instance, one can use a DSGE model to make a quantitative statement on the extent to which in a given period GDP growth was driven by technology, monetary policy, government spending shocks, etc. We will give an example of such an application in Section 9.

Second, DSGE models feature a well-defined measure of optimality. Household behavior is derived from the principle of welfare maximization, which constitutes a natural metric for optimality. One is able to test various policies against this metric and can for instance evaluate the claim that a 2%
inflation target is better than a 2% deflation target. More than that, one can not only rank policies but also compare them in a quantitative sense (for instance in terms of consumption equivalents).

Third, DSGE models can be used to design policy experiments. This statement refers to the well-known Lucas Critique (Lucas 1976). While parameters in reduced-form model equations (which populated traditional macroeconomic or econometric models) may change as a consequence of a new policy being introduced (rendering the model useless for testing this policy’s implications), parameters of DSGE models are supposed to reflect the basic rules of human behavior and thus ought to be robust to policy changes. To be fair, we must admit that DSGE models, besides such “deep” parameters sometimes feature less microfounded parameters as well (e.g., the curvature of the investment adjustment cost function). As a result, in practice, their robustness to the Lucas Critique may not be complete. However, we treat this fact as a rationale for doing more research on “proper” microfoundations rather than for rejecting the idea of microfounding models as such.

Some economists have pointed out that many assumptions underlying DSGE models cannot be deemed realistic, which makes the models unreliable. Some of these have already been mentioned above (rational expectations, lack of heterogeneity etc.). But nothing prevents a DSGE model to be more realistic in some areas if the question that the researcher tries to answer requires it. Let us repeat again, DSGE stands for Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium. It does not stand for “representative agent”, “rational expectations”, “lack of financial sector” or “flexible prices”.

Let us give a very simple example here, more elaborated problems will follow in the subsequent sections. The prototype of all DSGE models is the Real Business Cycle model by Kydland and Prescott (1982). In this model households maximize lifetime utility (stemming from consumption and leisure), firms are perfectly competitive, prices fully flexible and economic (business cycle) fluctuations are the consequence of technology shocks hitting the economy. In spite of its simplicity the model is able to reproduce several important features of business cycle fluctuations (e.g., consumption being less and investment being more volatile than output, all these variables being procyclical, etc.). However, economists noticed soon that the assumption of perfectly flexible prices prevents the RBC model from saying anything useful about monetary policy. This led the profession to develop the New Keynesian model, where the RBC core is extended for sticky prices and monetary policy has meaningful effects.

Does this mean that we should construct ever more complicated models with ever more “realistic” features? Some economists seem to long for a model that encompasses all features of the real world. Let us briefly explain why we believe that there are clear limits to this and that small models can still be useful.

In our view the role of a model is not to perfectly reflect reality, but to help us understand its specific aspects. Big models are usually intractable and still far too imprecise to be a good approximation of everything that happens in the economy. This is equally true for microfounded DSGE models and for models without explicit behavior optimization. We believe that a good model should encompass only the most relevant features which are necessary to understand the problem at hand. Take as an example the Solow (1956) growth model. It is very simple, the key law of motion consists of one difference equation. Nevertheless, it helps to understand the basics of economic growth and has the ability to explain economic convergence. Of course, as is well known, the Solow model does not explain where productivity growth comes from, and if we want to understand this, we need to investigate deeper into the nature of technology.

By introducing modifications one at a time we can understand better if and why they are important. Consider the basic NK model and an economist who thinks that the model lacks sticky
wages, imperfect information, idiosyncratic shocks, unemployment, a banking sector, a money market, a government, 194 foreign economic partners (there are 195 countries in the world), CO2 emissions and several other important features of the world to become “realistic”. Assume that the economist manages to construct and solve the model and then derives (probably supercomplicated) conclusions about optimal monetary policy. Is he/she able to understand and explain which features of the model are responsible for the optimal policy rule? Probably not. In contrast, adding for instance only sticky wages helps to understand that monetary policy should target a weighted average of volatilities of the output gap, price inflation and wage inflation (the latter being the new element that emerges once we take wage stickiness into account).

What do these arguments mean in the context of contemporaneous DSGE modeling? Over the last 25 years (or so) economists successfully brought various imperfections of the real world (be it departures from rationality or market imperfections) into the standard macroeconomic DSGE framework. This helped us understand how these imperfections affect economic behavior at the macro level. However, our models are not able to handle all imperfections that one can think of simultaneously, rather we are bound to accommodate them one by one. This is more tractable and more transparent, but certainly very far from having a complete “realistic” framework.

Having said this, we wish to stress one final thing. To study economics in a competent way we need tools. DSGE models are such tools and in this paper we claim that they can be useful. This does not, however, mean that they should be applied to all possible economic problems. For many applications alternative approaches (e.g., econometric models, semi-structural models, agent-based models) are more appropriate and, hence, should be used. We see a comparative advantage of DSGE models in applications where their specific features, discussed above, matter.

Let us stop the introduction to DSGE modeling here and move to specific aspects of the DSGE critique. The Reader interested in the basics of DSGE models can be, for instance, referred to Wickens (2012).

3 Microfoundations

In contrast to many terms for which DSGE does not stand, it seems indeed immanently bound to the idea of optimizing agents (i.e., microfoundations). Let us first explain where this idea originated from and why we (and many other economists) believe that it is an important ingredient of macroeconomic modeling. Then, let us discuss how we see the limits of its practical implementation.

The popularity of deriving macroeconomic models from microeconomic optimization follows the Lucas (1976) Critique introduced in the preceding section (although microfounded models had been constructed much earlier, see e.g., Ramsey 1928). It is in fact microfoundations that are crucial for the three sources of DSGE models’ popularity discussed before: interpretability, measurement of optimality and robustness to policy changes. It is also microfoundations that allow researchers to check and understand how various aspects of human behavior affect macroeconomic outcomes. This is the very reason why we believe that microfoundations provide important value added to modeling. Podkaminer (2021) is correct to claim that macroeconomic models can be constructed without explicit microfoundations. We believe, however, that following this line we would lose important benefits. In a sense microfounded models are exactly what critiques of DSGE modeling
(probably without knowing it) long for – these are the models that make it possible to understand how deviations from the rational, representative, forward-looking agent affect economic outcomes!

Let us now move to the more practical issue: what precisely do microfoundations mean? In the basic RBC model agents (households) maximize lifetime welfare construed as the infinite discounted sum of period utilities. These period utilities in turn are functions of consumption and leisure. This may seem at the same time simplistic (are people really concerned only with consuming and having free time?) and complicated (who produces optimal plans until the end of the world?).

It is, we agree. As argued above, models are by necessity simplified descriptions of the world. However, if a particular simplification seems too rudimentary it should be adjusted. Nobody prevents the modeler to make the optimization problem more sophisticated (and still stay in the DSGE paradigm) if he/she believes that this is crucial to deal with the research question at hand. To some extent this has been done in the literature. For instance, the infinite optimization horizon is often substituted with a finite one when discussing fiscal policy, pension system design or demographics (see Section 4, where we refer to the application of overlapping generations models). The assumption that agents optimize forming expectations about the future rationally has been dealt with in the literature as well (see Section 5).

But in other dimensions progress has been small. In particular, not much research has been done yet on the functional form of the period utility function, including its (usually just two) arguments. While the findings of behavioral researchers may not be easy to accommodate, definitely much more effort should be devoted to checking how taking account of (at least some of) them affects macromodels. For instance, empirical research into the sources of happiness documents that people suffer from being unemployed (beyond the pure effect related to losing income). Would taking this into account have implications for optimal monetary or tax policy that are significantly different from those derived under standard assumptions? We do not know, but we believe that the proper way of dealing with such problems is to check, not to reject microfounded modeling as such.

All in all, we believe that the idea of having microfounded models is simply useful. Rejecting it would harm interpretability, robustness and deprive us of a natural metric for optimality. Nevertheless, we also believe that much more research on the nature of utility would be more than welcome.

4 Heterogeneity

People are heterogenous. They differ in tastes, patience, education levels, sex, age, wealth, work status and many other features which influence their behavior. The claim that basic DSGE models do not take this heterogeneity into account is true. In the RBC model the problem of a representative household is solved. In the NK model firms produce differentiated goods and households may differ in the work type they exert but these types of heterogeneity are highly stylized and introduced only to allow the introduction of price or wage stickiness. Hence, the claim that these baseline models ignore heterogeneity is correct.

What is, however, not correct, is the automatic conclusion that representative agent models are hence useless. In the spirit of our arguments from Section 2, one first has to answer the question whether taking heterogeneity into account is important for answering the question at hand. We can think of many applications where the answer is “no”. As explained before, a “no” does not mean that
heterogeneity (or its particular dimension) is completely irrelevant. It only means that its importance for the question at hand can be ignored for the sake of tractability. Take the standard NK model and the question how price stickiness affects the impact of demand shocks on output. Do we need heterogeneous households to answer this question? Our answer is “no”, the impact of price stickiness on the slope of the Phillips curve is to a large extent independent of the structure of the household sector. Of course, via general equilibrium effects household heterogeneity would ultimately affect our findings, but these effects would most probably be of second order importance and, as mentioned before, can be ignored for the sake of tractability.

In many cases, however, the answer is “we do not know”. This is not a reason to reject ex cathedra the representative agent approach. This is a reason to construct a model with potentially relevant agent heterogeneity and to verify if (and why) it matters or not. The rest of this chapter is devoted to describing briefly two such areas of recent research.

Let us start with the approach that introduces heterogeneity of agents, e.g., in terms of their preferences or work status. Early seminal contributions to this line of research include Bewley (1977), Aiyagari (1994) and Krusell and Smith (1998). These papers introduced heterogeneity into relatively simple models, which nevertheless led to important findings. For instance Krusell and Smith (1998) use a real, stochastic, microfounded model with agents that differ in time preferences (more or less patient) and work status (employed or unemployed) to show that in such a setting the cost of business cycle fluctuations rises an order of magnitude above the cost in a representative agent setting (Lucas 1987, 2003).

Recent developments go much further. Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2018) construct a new Keynesian model with heterogeneous agents and analyze the working of monetary policy in such a framework. In the model households work, consume and invest in liquid and illiquid assets and face borrowing limits. Labor productivity is idiosyncratic and follows a stochastic process. As a consequence, households differ in asset holdings and in decision rules. The production side of the economy is standard for new Keynesian models, with monopolistic competition and sticky prices and the central bank targeting the short-term interest rate. It should be noted that the model is able to match among others the distribution of wealth across households, so that the heterogeneity is far from trivial.

Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2018) examine for example, how monetary policy affects consumption. In the standard representative agent new Keynesian model this happens primarily via the intertemporal substitution channel – higher real interest rates induce agents to increase savings and shift consumption into the future. In contrast, when household heterogeneity is taken into account, indirect effects that result from reduced labor demand and lower labor income start playing an important role.

The second line of research we wish to introduce is based on overlapping generations (OLG) models. These models, originating from Diamond (1965) allow the introduction of another very important dimension of heterogeneity – age. People obviously differ in age and age clearly affects many aspects of our lives (for instance our labor market status, asset position or propensity to consume).

OLG models have found a number of applications, for instance in the area of pension system research. Recently these models have also been used to study problems relevant to monetary policy and economic growth. For instance, Kara and von Thadden (2016), Carvalho, Ferrero, Nechio (2016), Eggertsson, Mehrotra, Robbins (2019) all use overlapping generations models to investigate the impact of demographics on economic growth, secular stagnation and the natural rate of interest.

To see a sample of what this class of models offers let us take a closer look at a paper by Bielecki, Brzoza-Brzezina and Kolasa (2018). The Authors merge an OLG and a NK model. The framework is
quite detailed, it enables modeling 80 cohorts that differ in age. As shown in the left panel of Figure 1 the model is precise enough to reproduce the distribution of assets over the life-cycle for the euro-area (evidence from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey). Introduction of nominal frictions allows matching the aggregate reactions of the economy to monetary policy (as known from VAR models) and reproducing the main features of business cycle fluctuations.

The model takes as exogenous the past and projected future paths of fertility and mortality rates (EUROPOP data) and generates both long-run (deterministic) simulations of the economy conditional on the demography and short-term (stochastic) simulations of business cycle properties (also conditional on the demography). As a result, the authors show, inter alia, that due to population ageing the natural rate of interest declined in the euro area since 1980 by over 1.5 percentage points (Figure 1, right panel). As a consequence, the probability of hitting the zero lower bound on interest rates sharply increases (from less than 4% in the whole 1980s decade to over 30% in the 2020s decade).

**Figure 1**
The ability of the New Keynesian – OLG model to match asset distribution and the simulated impact of ageing on the natural rate of interest

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All in all, heterogeneity can be (and is) taken into account in the context of DSGE models. Sometimes it makes it possible to take a deeper look into a black box (like the monetary transmission mechanism). Sometimes it can be a sine qua non condition for tackling the question at hand.
5 Non-rational behavior

The rational expectations hypothesis – the backbone of modern macroeconomics and DSGE models – has been developed in response to large structural macroeconomic models of the 1960s and 1970s. While Muth (1961) was first to use the term *rational expectations* and to use mathematical conditional expectations to describe the expectation formation process, the revolution in macroeconomics started later.\(^2\) At that time macroeconomic models did not take into account that (i) expectations about future matter for today’s decision and (ii) agents react to the changes in their economic environment, e.g., taxes. However, individual choices of agents, whether they are households, firms or government, at any point in time are heavily influenced by what they believe about the future. It is almost impossible to think of a decision problem (be it consumption, hours worked, saving, production, pricing, etc.) that does not depend on the expectations about what lies ahead. A complete description of individuals’ decision problems, therefore, must explicitly model how agents form their expectations. Rational expectations provide a consistent framework that fulfils this need.

The hypothesis rests upon two assumptions (i) agents are individually rational, and (ii) their beliefs are consistent.\(^3\) Individual rationality means not only that agents form and update their own beliefs correctly but also that their choices are consistent with these beliefs. Consistency implies that subjective distribution agents use to assign the probability of future events agrees with the actual distribution.

The rational expectation hypothesis has profound implications and has changed how macroeconomic models were constructed. At the same time, while elegant and simple in its nature, rational expectations assume a lot of knowledge on the part of agents. For one, the unbiasedness and consistency of the forecasts imply that agents, be it households or firms, have a very good grasp of the economy: when they make their prediction they are on average correct and they do not make consistent (and hence exploitable) mistakes.

Whether forecasts are rational has been open to debate and is in fact an empirical question. Lucas, Prescott, and Sargent, the heralds of the new paradigm in macroeconomics, knew about it all too well.\(^4\) While they considered rational expectations as a theoretical construct and a convenient tool to discipline the discussion on expectations, from the very beginning they were aware that households and firms may not be all-knowing or in possession of full information. While most of the DSGE models rely on full information rational expectations there is a substantial and growing literature that relaxes this assumption and considers alternative specifications. Such models are able to explain many economic phenomena that were difficult to account for otherwise: from the behavior of asset prices through the forward guidance puzzle to the arrival and end of the Great Moderation.\(^5\) They have also been important from the perspective of monetary and fiscal policy: its design, optimality and implementation. In what follows we briefly mention four studies that consider deviations from rational expectations.

\(^2\) Of course the importance of expectations and the expectation formation process have been studied much before Muth.
\(^3\) See Sargent (1993) and Barberis and Thaler (2003) for a more detailed description.
\(^4\) Already in Sargent (1973) the rational-expectations hypothesis is tested and accepted. He also explains why many other tests that rejected the hypothesis are invalid. Similarly Kydland and Prescott (1977) discuss the validity of rational expectations.
Bounded rationality and econometric approach to learning as an alternative to RE method of determining expectations and updating beliefs attracted a lot of attention. Already Sargent (1973) mentioned that expectations in the model could be obtained by agents running ordinary least squares regressions. In this approach agents become econometricians who every period, once the new data becomes available, re-estimate equation(s) describing their perception and understanding of the macroeconomy. Eusepi and Preston (2011) show that this mechanism is potentially qualitatively and quantitatively important even in a simple RBC model. Not only does their model match data better than standard RBC in terms of volatility but also significantly improves the persistence of variables. Moreover, since the model focuses on expectations and learning it is particularly interesting that errors which households are making are consistent with actual data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters.

Pintus and Suda (2019) also follow this path in their study of the effects of non-rational expectations and learning in an otherwise standard RBC model with financial frictions (see also Section 6 on financial frictions). Instead of assuming that households have full information and rational expectation, they let households behave as if they were econometricians, who routinely re-estimate and update their view of the world. Households use these estimates to form expectations about the future and to decide how much to consume, work, save, etc. These choices affect the economy both at the individual and aggregate levels.

When agents update their beliefs about the economy the responses of output and other aggregates to a shock under adaptive learning are significantly larger than under rational expectations. Pintus and Suda (2019) show that learning amplifies the leverage shocks by a factor of about three relative to rational expectations. Panel A in Figure 2 depicts the impulse responses of output to a negative leverage shock under two alternative specifications of expectations that clearly illustrate this amplification.

In fact, not only does learning amplify the shock but it also generates a temporary overreaction of households and economy as agents realize that they were overly pessimistic about the repercussion of the shock. Importantly, this pessimism (represented by the overestimation of how long the negative shock would last) is fully endogenous and driven by the data and the learning process.

Figure 2
The impulse responses and evolution of output under rational expectations (dotted line) and learning (solid line)

Source: Pintus, Suda (2019).
Finally, Pintus and Suda (2019) examine to what extent can the deviation from full information rational expectations and learning account for the crisis. Panel B in Figure 2 shows that when fed with actual data, the learning model predicts the correct magnitude for the Great Recession, while its rational expectations counterpart predicts a counter-factual expansion.

An alternative approach to deviation from rational expectations is taken by Angeletos and La’O (2020). Rather than assuming full information rational expectations they consider instead a DSGE model in which firms choose both prices and the output level having only incomplete information about the state of the economy. This friction induces an alternative to Calvo-like price stickiness in the model: rather than not being able to change prices in any given quarter firms choose to do so or not. Angeletos and La’O (2020) show that such informational friction is important for the design of optimal monetary policy: it is no longer optimal to target price stability (the usual prescription in a NK model) but rather to lean against the wind by inducing negative correlation between the price level and GDP.

In a recent paper, Gabaix (2020) introduces yet another alternative approach to bounded rationality and considers a version of the New Keynesian model in which agents are not fully rational. In particular, the paper allows agents (both households and firms) to be short-sighted. While they are assumed to have complete understanding of the contemporaneous situation, they may not properly forecast the environment they will be facing in the future. They cannot account fully for events that are far into the future and “the more distant the events in the future the more the behavioral agent “sees them dimly”. Gabaix (2020) assumes that households and firms perceive correctly the steady state or the average value of endogenous variables, e.g., interest rate or inflation, and they know what the current state of the world is (e.g., how far the current inflation is from its steady state) just like the rational agent, but when they think about future deviations from that value they are myopic. Gabaix (2020) describes this as cognitive discounting: the further out in the future the object of their forecast is, the closer these expectations are to the mean.

His approach succeeds in addressing a number of puzzles in the NK model related to forward guidance, the zero lower bound and the Fisher effect. It also changes the inherent properties of the model (determinacy) and delivers strong recommendations for fiscal and monetary policies: from the Taylor principle no longer constituting a prerequisite for determinacy to the failure of Ricardian equivalence (agent is not Ricardian because he fails to perfectly anticipate future taxes).

Overall, the rational expectation assumption has provided a simple, consistent and clean way to describe the expectation formation process and to study its impact in DSGE models. However, this assumption has been tested empirically and there is growing empirical evidence suggesting the need for more research on expectations and how they contribute to the macroeconomy. The current state of DSGE research offers plenty of attractive alternatives. As we showed, they may deliver important macroeconomic policy implications that are at odds with those under rational expectations. How quantitatively significant and relevant these alternatives are is ultimately an empirical question but the answer will yield important policy implication, not only for monetary, fiscal or macroprudential tools and policies but also for the design, communication and implementation of these policies.6

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6 Recent studies point to the importance of expectations about a newly introduced policy and of its credibility, see for example, Honkapohja and Mitra (2020) on the introduction of price level targeting and Pintus, Suda and Turgut (2021) on the changes in macro-prudential policy under adaptive learning.
6 Financial frictions

The financial and economic crisis (2007–2009) took many economists by surprise. While the notion that there are imbalances in the global economy (in particular on current accounts and in housing markets) was relatively common, the size and speed of the international transmission of the breakdown was unexpected. Similar things can be said about economic modeling. While frameworks that allowed the inclusion of financial imperfections into macroeconomic models existed before the crisis (e.g., Kiyotaki, Moore 1997; Bernanke, Gertler, Gilchrist 1996; Iacoviello 2005), they were largely ignored by modelers. As a consequence, the absolute majority of DSGE models assumed perfectly functioning financial markets. For instance, in the NK model one single short-term interest rate exists, it is determined by the central bank and affects agents’ consumption and investment decisions.

However, one cannot claim that economists have not learned a lesson and have not done their homework. After the crisis we witnessed a surge in the number of models that merged macroeconomic and financial factors, taking into account the fact that the financial sector can be a source of important shocks or frictions with a sizeable macroeconomic impact. Again, we do not intend to offer a deep review of the existing literature. Instead, we review three papers to give a taste of what current DSGE models with financial frictions can offer. The first one introduces a banking sector into a DSGE model and calculates optimal capital requirements. The second introduces financial frictions into a DSGE model and shows that financial (risk premium) shocks are the main driver of business cycle fluctuations. The third one deals with housing boom-and-bust cycles and documents their importance for the transmission of monetary policy.

Mendicino et al. (2018) construct a model with heterogeneous households (savers and borrowers) and entrepreneurs (borrowers). A banking sector intermediates between these groups. Households, firms and banks are subject to the risk of default. In such an environment bank capital requirements by affecting leverage have an impact on the probabilities of default.

The model is then used to calculate optimal bank capital leverage ratios. The authors show that increasing capital requirements up to a certain level are Pareto-improving as they reduce the probability of bank default and the associated social cost. When the probability of default is already low, a further tightening of capital requirements makes borrowers worse-off as it makes loans more costly. The model makes it possible to discuss the quantitative requirements of Basel II regulations, for instance showing that the optimal regulation for mortgage and corporate loans is tighter than officially required.

The modeling framework of Mendicino et al. (2018) is not only sufficiently detailed to discuss banking sector regulation rules, but also makes explicit use of one of the main benefits of DSGE models – an explicitly formulated utility function and the related measure of optimality.

In contrast to the first paper, our second example concentrates on frictions stemming from financial markets rather than from the banking sector. Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2014) construct an otherwise standard DSGE model extended for the presence of financial market imperfections. In particular, entrepreneurs take loans and face a financing premium which depends on how risky their business is (how likely they are to default). Risk can vary over time and Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2014) estimate it (and its impact on the economy) from aggregate data. They show that more than

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7 This could have to some extent resulted from early attempts to quantify the impact of financial frictions on the economy. For instance, Kocherlakota (2000) analyzes a borrowing constraint in a simple production economy and shows that the amplifying impact of the credit constraint is not robust to model calibration.
50% of business cycle fluctuations in the US can be explained by risk shocks that impact the economy by affecting the financing premium of firms.

The last paper by Bluwstein et al. (2020) asks the question how the housing cycle affects the transmission of monetary policy. The paper develops a DSGE model where households can take mortgage loans and buy housing. The model takes into account strong nonlinearities (we will come back to this aspect in Section 8) that exist in the mortgage market (like the occasionally binding nature of collateral constraints). The model is estimated, which makes it possible to show how asymmetrically the economy can react to monetary policy shocks. Figure 3 below shows how mortgage debt and GDP in the US would have reacted to a monetary policy expansion (upper panel) and contraction (lower panel) in 2002. A clear asymmetry can be observed, the economy reacts much faster to the expansion. The contractionary effect is initially prevented by the already very tight mortgage market in 2002.

Figure 3
Impulse responses to an expansionary and contractionary monetary policy shock

Note: the figure presents impulse responses of mortgage debt and GDP to an expansionary and contractionary monetary policy shock. All reactions are presented as percent deviations from steady state. Time (horizontal axis) is in quarters. Source: adapted from Bluwstein et al. (2020).
All in all, we note that contemporaneous DSGE models often feature selected aspects of the banking/financial/housing sectors and related imperfections and disturbances. These models can be used to provide qualitatively and quantitatively relevant answers to important economic questions. Readers interested in this area of research can refer for instance to Claessens and Kose (2017).

7 Unemployment

Contrary to the claim in Podkaminer (2021), the importance of labor market was recognized in the DSGE literature from the very beginning. The choice of working hours and its impact on both consumption and output was paramount from the get-go. It is true that the very first RBC model of Kydland and Prescott (1982) did not model unemployment directly. The early solutions for the missing unemployment in the RBC model became available in the mid-1980s with the work of Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988). Instead of allowing households to work a desired amount of hours Rogerson (1988) constructed a model with a more realistic case – one can be either employed and work a fixed number of hours or be out of job. Hansen (1985) applied this setting to the RBC framework and showed that such a model accounts well for the empirical observation: fluctuations in aggregate hours of work are due to changes in the number of people employed rather than to fluctuations in the number of hours worked per person. Moreover, this extension resulted in a model with unemployment in equilibrium. At the same time his results indicated that the properties of the RBC model are not significantly changed if one does not model unemployment directly. Extending this work, Kydland (1995) developed a model that accounted for variation in both hours-per-worker and employment but the general message remained unchanged.8

The developments in the labor market literature, notably the search framework of Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1985), have changed the treatment of unemployment in DSGE models. The new framework emphasized the costly and time-consuming process of matching workers seeking employment with firms seeking to fill job vacancies. How quickly unemployment returns to its steady-state level after an adverse shock, whether it is a real or a nominal shock, is likely to be influenced by how efficiently the labor market is able to generate new matches between firms and unemployed workers. Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) were the first to introduce labor market frictions in an otherwise standard RBC model,9 while Walsh (2003) was the first to introduce them in a NK framework. A model that incorporates both an aggregate labor market matching function and price stickiness turned out to be invaluable for understanding the dynamic adjustment of the economy to a monetary policy shock.

The arrival of disaggregated data and the development of solution methods (see also Section 4 and Section 8) brought even more progress. Using models featuring important elements of the labor market allows researchers to answer questions that reduced form models cannot address. We are well aware of the importance of the general equilibrium approach for the proper understanding of the labor market and ongoing research allows us to better evaluate its impact on and the interaction with the economy.

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8 Earlier work of Kydland (1984) considered heterogeneity in the labor market. Other early papers that considered both an extensive and an intensive margin were Cho and Rogerson (1988) and Kydland and Prescott (1991).

9 Andolfatto (1996) considers both an extensive margin (through hiring) and an intensive margin (through adjustment of hours) as sources of labor fluctuations.
We present two recent papers that extend a DSGE model with a more detailed characterization of the labor market along two dimensions. The first one takes a standard NK model and couples it with the latest developments in labor market research. The second one studies the interaction of labor and financial markets.

Christiano, Eichenbaum, Trabandt (2016) is an example of the approach in which the recent advancements in labor market literature are introduced into a standard macroeconomic model. The paper extends the labor search and matching framework for an alternative specification of how the real wage rate is decided. The authors consider an alternating offer bargaining in which firms and workers negotiate the current wage rate. Importantly, the bargaining occurs not only between those that just met for the first time but also between those pairs that reached an agreement in the previous period. This formulation allows the authors not only to examine the dynamics of labor market variables (wages, unemployment, etc.) but also study the effects of new policies that affect the situation on the labor market, say, a change in unemployment benefits.

Christiano, Eichenbaum, Trabandt (2016) find that their model improves on the existing studies in several dimensions. First, it delivers real wages inertia as an equilibrium outcome rather than an assumption. Second, it generates heterogeneity in the variability of salaries across different workers: wages of new hires are more volatile than wages of those workers that already have a job. Both results are consistent with empirical evidence.

From the policy perspective Christiano, Eichenbaum, Trabandt (2016) show that the impact of an increase in unemployment benefits very much depends on monetary policy and whether the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rate binds. When it does, the temporary increase can, in fact, reduce the unemployment rate and increase economic activity. This is in stark contrast to “normal times” with nominal interest rate being free to adjust, when the increase in unemployment benefits would result in higher unemployment. These results are both novel and important for the policy response to various shocks.

Another, this time empirical, rationale for integrating a detailed description of the labor market into a DSGE model is available in Singh, Suda, and Zervou (2021), who study the effects of monetary policy shocks on employment and earning dynamics. They find that there are significant differences in how small and large firms respond to actual and expected changes of the interest rate, suggesting the presence of both financial and labor market frictions. Their empirical finding is in line with theoretical results of Iliopulos, Langot and Sopraseuth (2019), who consider a version of a real business cycle model with explicitly modeled labor and financial markets. Their focus is on how the search and matching friction in labor market coupled with the presence of collateral constraints limiting firms' access to credit matters from the welfare perspective. Iliopulos, Langot and Sopraseuth (2019) find that the interactions between labor and financial markets frictions are qualitatively and quantitatively important: the interplay of these markets magnifies the impact of shocks and can lead, in the case of adverse shocks, to higher average unemployment and a substantially higher cost of the business-cycle.

In the last 25 years we have witnessed tremendous progress within the DSGE framework with respect to the specification of the labor market. We now have models that are consistent with micro- and macro-evidence on the dynamics of key labor variables and that can be used to tackle qualitatively and quantitatively important questions.

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10 Other examples of papers that extend a standard RBC model in a similar manner are Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2013) and Antosiewicz and Suda (2016), who allow on-the-job search and Hall (2005), who proposes an alternative setting for wage determination.
8 Solution methods

Another argument that has been raised against DSGE models is their inability to take into account nonlinearities. As is well known, many important economic relationships are nonlinear – think, for instance, of the production or utility function or the lower bound constraint on interest rates. Several things require clarification here. First, where does the notion that DSGE models must be linearized come from (and is it true)? Second, do all nonlinearities require special treatment? Third, are there methods to deal with nonlinearities?

Let us start with the first problem. Indeed, many DSGE models (in spite of consisting of nonlinear equations) are ultimately linearized (or log-linearized), by deriving a first-order approximation to the nonlinear equations. In practice this can be either done with pen and pencil or on the computer. In the early days of DSGE modeling (1980s) this was the standard approach to solving models. Today, as we will show later, there are several alternatives that allow dealing with nonlinearities and can be used if necessary. Nevertheless, linearizing the model has several advantages. First, finding the solution of a linear system is fast. Second, over the last 20 years the profession has made huge progress in developing estimation techniques for DSGE models (see next section for details). However, with little exceptions these are still available mainly for linearized models.

Given the fact that linearizing models can be useful it is natural to ask how much harm this does. The answer, as so often in economics, is “it depends”, primarily on the type of nonlinearity. Even the most basic DSGE models contain several nonlinear equations. Think of the Euler equation, which postulates a nonlinear relationship between consumption today and tomorrow. Linearization is of course an approximation and as such will generate deviations from the “true” nonlinear relationship. The ultimate question whether this is a problem or not becomes quantitative – how big are the errors? A popular measurement technique consists of running a stochastic simulation with the linearized model, plugging the artificial time series into an original (nonlinear) equation of the model and calculating the difference between its left- and right-hand side (preferably in percentage terms). Figure 4 provides the Euler equation errors for a stochastic simulation of a standard New Keynesian model (expressed in percentage terms). Obviously, these are very small, and do not exceed 0.03%. Hence, the linear approximation does not seem to be harmful in this case.

The obvious question is, to what extent can this finding be generalized? A practical answer is that it can be for nonlinearities resulting from convexity or concavity of functions usually used in DSGE models. However, there are obvious cases when the nonlinearity is so strong that a linear approximation breaks down. One example is the lower bound on interest rates. When taken into account it generates a kink in the Taylor rule and a linear approximation around a low, positive interest rate will clearly result in large errors when interest rates fall. Figure 5 documents Taylor rule errors in the case of a linear approximation with a zero lower bound constraint. Obviously, the errors are now large and mainly one sided – when the economy hits the ZLB constraint they increase even to 1%.

Another inconvenience resulting from linearization is related to the presence (and potential importance) of risk. A linear approximation assumes risk away. However, in the real world agents face risk and they react to it. This is also the case with DSGE models, at least as long as nonlinearities are taken into account. Following the reasoning introduced earlier, whether linearization is harmful in this respect or not depends on whether the impact of risk is important given the economic problem we wish to handle. If the question is about the impact of a small tightening of macroprudential policy then risk
can probably be ignored, e.g., the level effects of tighter loan-to-value ratios are likely to be dominant. If, however, the question is about the impact of uncertainty shocks on savings and consumption, then clearly risk is at the heart of the problem and should not be ignored.

Figure 4
Euler equation errors in the New Keynesian model

![Euler equation errors in the New Keynesian model](image)

Source: own simulations.

Figure 5
Taylor rule errors in the New Keynesian model with the ZLB constraint

![Taylor rule errors in the New Keynesian model with the ZLB constraint](image)

Source: own simulations.
All we want to say so far is this: linearizing DSGE models is useful and in many cases harmless. However, there may be cases where this should not be done. The question is hence, are we toothless in such cases?

The answer is, we are definitely not. There are several solution techniques that allow us to deal with nonlinearities and risk. They bear some cost and face limits, but if applied appropriately, they can be powerful and helpful. Let us briefly review the main approaches available and use this opportunity to briefly introduce some interesting papers from the literature.

One option is to use perfect foresight solution methods. These take the complete nonlinear structure of the model into account but solve the model under the assumption that all future shocks are known. This was, for instance, the solution method in the paper by Bielecki, Brzoza-Brzezina, Kolasa (2018) reviewed in Section 4, where it was assumed that households know future demographic processes.

Another option is to use global methods. They rely on approximating policy functions of the model using polynomials not only in the vicinity of the steady state (as we usually do when linearising), but across the entire state space of the model (or at least the part where the economy is likely to be at some point in time). A very interesting example of such an approach is the paper by Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2015), where the New Keynesian model is solved and simulated in the presence of the ZLB. The paper shows for instance how the government spending multiplier depends on the existence of the ZLB or on the size of the government expenditure shock. It must, however, be mentioned that global solution methods are very computation-intensive and can be applied only to relatively small models.

One more useful solution technique is the piecewise-linear approach. Essentially, it relies on linearizing the model twice around points with properties that differ sharply due to the problematic nonlinearity. The solution switches then between the two regimes. Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) develop a toolbox that implements this solution technique and show for instance its applications to an RBC model with irreversible investment.

Finally, let us return to the problem of handling risk. A relatively simple way of doing this is to use higher order approximations to the model's equilibrium conditions. A second order approximation makes it possible to introduce constant risk. A third order approximation allows for risk to vary over time. Basu and Bundick (2018) use a New Keynesian model to check how the economy reacts to risk shocks (and specifically to the volatility of preference shocks). They show that such shocks can generate a positive comovement between main macroeconomic aggregates like output, consumption, investment and inflation.

All in all, while it is true that DSGE models are often linearized, this need not be bad and need not result in serious imprecisions. For the cases when nonlinearities are really important economists have developed a number of solution methods that can handle such problems. The Reader interested in more details about solution techniques can be referred for instance to Judd (1998) or Heer and Maussner (2009).

9 Estimation

The final issue that we want to discuss is related to confronting the model with data.

The initial approach of bringing an RBC model to data relied heavily on calibration. In this approach, we choose values of parameters in the model so that the model's equilibrium (either steady
Are DSGE models irreparably flawed?

State or dynamics) exactly matches the statistics of observations on either growth rates or long-run relations between variables. While this procedure may seem ad hoc, it can be formally represented as a method of moments estimation in a system that is exactly identified, as shown by Christiano and Eichenbaum (1988). Moreover, already in the 1990s standard econometric techniques were used to confront RBC models with data, for example Altug (1989) uses traditional maximum likelihood methods, while Eichenbaum, Hansen, and Singleton (1988) employ GMM. Similarly, the same classical methods were later used to estimate small, medium and large New Keynesian models, see Linde (2005) for an example of maximum likelihood estimation or Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) for the application of method of moments in the form of matching impulse responses.

The classical approach to the estimation of DSGE models relies mostly on well-established techniques as likelihood-based estimation, simulated method of moments estimation, or GMM estimation. Since these methods are well established and widely applied in different fields of economics, applying them in the context of a dynamic macroeconomic model is relatively straightforward. These tools have been routinely used to estimate parameters, derive testable implications and generate macroeconomic forecasts.

The true breakthrough in the estimation of DSGE models came with the rapid advancements in both Bayesian estimation techniques and computer power. The basic premise of the Bayesian approach is to combine a prior distribution of parameters reflecting any prior knowledge of the econometrician with the likelihood function to form the posterior distribution of parameters encompassing both initial beliefs and data.

Several characteristics of DSGE models make the Bayesian approach to estimation more practical and, therefore, appealing as compared to classical methods. Model parameter restrictions, parameter estimates near boundaries and sample size issues, while posing a serious problem for the implementation or validity of classical ML or GMM estimators, create no special difficulties in the Bayesian framework. Moreover, the possibility of specifying prior beliefs regarding unknown parameters makes economic and practical sense. The prior distribution reflects any available information of an econometrician prior to seeing the data. One can include available information and evidence coming from the existing micro and macro studies in a transparent way. Additionally, the use of prior distributions over the structural parameters can help with making the highly nonlinear optimization procedure more stable. These features are particularly valuable when only short time series are available.

Even though Bayesian statistics has a long history, it is the 1990s that saw the rise of its application in econometrics. The first papers that applied them to a simple RBC model were DeJong, Ingram, and Whitman (2000) and Otrok (2001) but quickly much larger DSGE models were also estimated, see Smets and Wouters (2003).

The solution of a DSGE model can be cast in the state-space form where one equation (state or transition equation) captures the dynamics of the model while the other equation (measurement equation) links the model to data. Both of these equations contain and are functions of unknown parameters that we try to estimate. Eventually we end up with a state-space representation, which characterizes the joint distribution of the data and the model variables conditional on DSGE model parameters.

Given the nature of model estimation, the estimation process is inherently related to the solution method: every time a new set of structural parameters’ values is considered the model (for these parameters) needs to be solved and likelihood evaluated. Since finding the solution and evaluating
the likelihood can be computationally intensive and time-consuming, the linear (first-order) approximations of a DSGE model are most commonly used in the econometric setting. If the DSGE model is solved using a non-linear approach described in Section 8 above, whether it is a higher order approximation or a global technique, the problem becomes more involved as either the state-transition equation or the measurement equation, or both, become non-linear. If one, however, conforms to linear state-space representation of the model and its connection to data, the Kalman Filter provides accurate results quickly. Since linear approximation works well around the steady state this can work relatively well in “normal times”.

This approach is no longer appropriate when the model itself features important non-linearities that we want or need to preserve. Whenever we want to allow changes in the volatility of stochastic shocks to capture variation in macroeconomic uncertainty, consider a regime-switching process describing fiscal or monetary policy, or allow occasionally binding constraints for ZLB or collateral constraints we may need to look beyond linear models. The paper by Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2007) was the first to approximate the likelihood function of a non-linear DSGE model using a particle filter that allows the estimation of this class of models. With the increased computational power the evaluation of the likelihood function of non-linear models is no longer prohibitively costly (in terms of time). Since then many refinements of the original idea were proposed and we observe rapid development in that area.

Winberry (2018) proposes an alternative approach that makes it possible to take into account non-linear features of the model but use linear tools for estimation. His method relies on the projection method to find the solution of the model yet uses the linear framework for estimation. Winberry (2018) uses a global solution method to find conditions for model equilibrium but then takes a first or second order approximation of these conditions around the steady state. This approach allows him to use a standard software (Dynare) to estimate the parameters using Bayesian techniques and still evaluate the Holy Grail of macroeconomic models: the highly non-linear model with heterogenous agents and aggregate shocks. Moreover, this approach can utilize both micro- and macro-level data in the estimation process.

Let us finish this section by showing one particular (and, in our view, attractive) application of estimated DSGE models. As already mentioned in Section 2, estimated models can be used to generate historical decompositions of data into shocks, among other things. Recall that a DSGE model describes the behavior of macroeconomic variables in an economy as an equilibrium outcome of the actions of households and firms in response to shocks. Historical decomposition allows us to attribute the extent to which a particular shock affects the behavior of macro variables. Figure 6 presents the example of a historical decomposition of GDP from Bielecki et al. (2019), who study the boom-bust cycle in a subgroup of peripheral euro area countries: Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. The black line depicts the deviation of GDP from the steady state in these countries while the bars depict contributions of different shocks to that path. The initial values box captures the effect of shocks that occurred before 1995. The authors find that it was housing market shocks that were the key forces responsible for the 2004–2007 expansion and, to some extent, for the recession of 2013–2015 in this part of the euro area.

The econometrics of DSGE models has gone a long way since Kydland and Prescott (1982). Calibration, MLE, GMM, Bayesian estimators based on Kalman or particle filters are included in a macroeconometric toolbox that are routinely used to deliver quantitative answers. A detailed description of these methods is beyond the scope of the present paper but we can refer the reader to
DeJong and Dave (2011), Fernández-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez and Schorfheide (2016), and Herbst and Schorfheide (2015) for the overview of recent methods in macroeconometrics. The current frontier of research on the econometrics of DSGE model can be found in Fernández-Villaverde and Guerrón-Quintana (2021).

Figure 6
Historical shock decomposition of GDP

Source: Bielecki et al. (2019).

10 Conclusions

One can find many faults of the DSGE framework: that it is too simplistic yet too difficult, that it attempts to include too many elements yet it does not include enough, that it is based on incorrect and unrealistic assumptions yet…, etc. While we agree that DSGE models are not perfect, we believe that for many applications the positives overwhelmingly outweigh the negatives. This attitude starts from the basic premise that having a model with a well-defined measure of optimality that properly accounts for the interactions between different agents and markets in a dynamic setting is key to understanding the macroeconomy.

Micro-foundations allow us to analyze behavior and responses of individual agents to changes in their environment. Take, for example, the problem of a household. By setting up an objective (maximization of utility) and constraints (budget constraint, collateral or borrowing constraint) we can make our analysis almost arbitrarily precise. First, we can choose the utility function so that it includes these elements that are empirically important for households. Second, if needed, we can either adjust the existing constraints or add new ones to capture the relevant features of households’ economic environment. Third, we can, in principle, consider as many types of households that differ in terms of objective and constraints as necessary. Fourth, we can easily track the effects of new policies or random
events since they are already part of the specification and give them a clear interpretation: we call a preference shock a “preference shock” because it affects the households’ preferences and collateral shock a “collateral shock” because it changes the collateral constraint. Fifth, if deemed necessary, we can drop the assumption that expectations are formed rationally or that the planning horizon is infinite. Finally, since we express the problem in terms of objective, we can rank different policies or different outcomes in terms of meeting this objective. This introduces a natural notion of optimality.

All these points apply to firms, banks, labor unions, etc. – by using micro-foundations we effectively consider a series of partial equilibrium problems that we can set up so they match empirical evidence. It is the “general equilibrium” part of the DSGE acronym that ensures that all individual partial equilibrium problems are glued together in a coherent manner. At the end of the day, no economic agents exists in complete isolation: workers interact with employers, consumers interact with producers, buyers meet sellers, lenders meet borrowers either directly or through banks, etc. and all of them are affected by economic policy. We can now also see if and how a preference shock that affects the choices of households impacts sellers, employers, borrowers, etc. We can see how this or any other shock affects prices and quantities on all markets not only during the shock but also over time.

DSGE models are highly flexible tools that make it possible to incorporate various features of economic reality. The key limitations that we really face is our ability to understand the models’ behavior and the computing power to find the solution. The early solutions relied on linear approximation and calibration but, as we showed, we are long past that stage.

This is not to say that the future of DSGE lies in large all-encompassing models. For many purposes it is the small models that focus on a particular sector of the economy, on a particular constraint, or on a particular objective that will turn out to be most useful. For other applications (say macroeconomic forecasting) larger models will be more appropriate.

We hope that we managed to convince the Reader that the last 25 years have witnessed tremendous progress in DSGE modelling and that many sources of criticism have been addressed. We are convinced, however, that much progress is still ahead of us. And this is the beauty of economic research.

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