Learning Financial Shocks
and the Great Recession*

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Abstract: This paper develops a simple business-cycle model in which financial shocks have large macroeconomic effects when private agents are gradually learning their uncertain environment. When agents update their beliefs about the parameters that govern the unobserved process driving financial shocks to the leverage ratio, the responses of output and other aggregates under adaptive learning are significantly larger than under rational expectations. In our benchmark case calibrated using US data on leverage, debt-to-GDP and land value-to-GDP ratios for 1996Q1-2008Q4, learning amplifies leverage shocks by a factor of about three, relative to rational expectations. When fed with actual leverage innovations observed over that period, the learning model predicts a sizeable recession in 2008-10, while its rational expectations counterpart predicts a counter-factual expansion. In addition, we show that procyclical leverage reinforces the amplification due to learning and, accordingly, that macro-prudential policies enforcing countercyclical leverage dampen the effects of leverage shocks.

Keywords: Borrowing Constraints, Collateral, Leverage, Learning, Financial Shocks, Recession

Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E32, E44, G18
1 Introduction

Whether or not banks and other financial institutions, policy-makers, households and firms relied on a decent approximation of the “true” probability distribution prior to the 2007-08 financial collapse is a key question to address if one is to understand the Great Recession. On the theoretical side, answering such a question involves relaxing the assumption that the data-generating process is known when agents make decisions in an economy that is subject to random disturbances (see Woodford [42] for a recent survey). This issue has been recently tackled by Hebert, Fuster and Laibson [17], who show that asset price booms and busts are more satisfactorily explained when forecasters use simple models that typically underestimate mean-reversion and overestimate the persistence of the impact of shocks. Ilut and Schneider [24] show that shocks driving the unknown mean level of productivity contribute significantly, under ambiguity aversion, to business cycles. In both contributions, the key assumption is that there is uncertainty about the “true” parameters (e.g. the mean and the autocorrelation) governing the random shocks that affect the economy.

In this paper, we contribute to this strand of literature by introducing statistical learning. More specifically, we examine how decision-makers get and revise their beliefs about the parameters of the stochastic process governing financial shocks as new data arrive, following Marcet and Sargent [34] and Evans and Honkapohja [15] (see also the related discussion in Evans [14]). This is similar, in spirit, to Hebert, Fuster and Laibson [17], Ilut and Schneider [24], since we assume that agents do not know these parameters. The key dimension we add is that agents may learn their economic environment by estimating the unknown parameters and by updating each period such estimates. In that sense, this paper follows closely Adam, Kuang and Marcet [1], Boz and Mendoza [5], Gelain and Lansing [20] by emphasizing how financial shocks affect asset prices, but it also differs by
measuring to what extent financial shocks help explain the fall in output and investment observed over the Great Recession period.

In a simple business-cycle model with collateral constraints, we show that dynamics under learning can differ significantly from the dynamics under rational expectations. More precisely, we find that the amplification of financial shocks is particularly large when agents overestimate either the persistence of financial shocks or the long-run level of financial conditions. We then simulate the model using actual financial innovations and we report that our learning model delivers a sizeable recession in 2008-2010, in contrast to the rational expectations that predicts a counterfactual expansion when subjected with the same financial shocks. The key random variable in our analysis is the leverage ratio defined by how much one can borrow out of the land market value. We show that when agents update their beliefs about the parameters that govern both the dynamics of endogenous variables as well as the unobserved process driving shocks to the leverage ratio, the responses of output and other aggregates under adaptive learning are significantly larger than under rational expectations. More specifically, we compare two settings: (i) the model with (full information) rational expectations, in which agents know the parameters governing the VAR(1) process governing the behavior of the economy; (ii) the model with learning, in which agents do not know the “true” parameters of the VAR(1) model and update their estimates as new data arrive.

Our results can be anticipated by looking at the panels in Figure 1. Panel a) of Figure 1 plots the US quarterly households’ leverage data (provided by Boz and Mendoza [5]) over the period 1996Q1-2010Q4 that covers the latest boom-bust behavior in the housing market. As explained in more details in Section 4, we take out of the raw data the endogenous component of leverage that has been (moderately) elastic to land prices prior to 2008 (Mian and Sufi [35]) and we estimate an AR(1) process on the residual (exogenous) component. Panel b) of Figure 1 reports the autocorrelation coefficient of
Figure 1: in Panel a) US Household Leverage Ratio 1996Q1-2010Q1 (Source: Boz and Mendoza [5]); in Panel b) Model Estimate of Leverage Autocorrelation 1996Q1-2010Q1; Panel a) Leverage Data

Panel b) Estimate of Persistence
the exogenous leverage component that is estimated under learning. The autocorrelation coefficient graphed in panel b) is obtained through constant-gain recursive estimation in real-time, as new data is collected. Panel b) shows that when confronted with the data in panel a), learning agents think of the AR(1) leverage process as moving towards unit root at the end of the period. Essentially, the level of leverage shows a rapid increase after 2006, when the land price stops expanding and starts falling - panel a) - and this also when learning agents start increasing their estimate of autocorrelation, which ends up being very close to one in the last two quarters of 2008. As a result, both the observed level of leverage and its estimated persistence peak at the same time, in 2008Q4. On the other hand, the rational expectations estimate, obtained by ordinary least squares over the whole sample period, is lower than its learning counterpart over the period shown in panel b) and it is around 0.976. Because the learning model generates the estimate shown in panel b) when fed with the actual leverage innovations, it predicts that the impact of the negative shock to leverage observed in 2008Q4 is three times bigger than under rational expectations. When believed under learning to be close to permanent, financial shocks have a larger effect on the economy, compared to rational expectations.

Our main findings are derived in a model that is a simple variant of Kiyotaki and Moore [28] based on Kocherlakota [29], in which it is known that little amplification is expected under rational expectations. We focus on financial shocks that drive up and down the leverage ratio, which according to the data in panel a) of Figure 1 are very persistent. We first perform two theoretical experiments. The first one assumes that agents know the economy’s steady state and, in particular, the mean level of leverage but not its autocorrelation, which is allowed to be time-varying. We calibrate the model using data on leverage, debt-to-GDP and land value-to-GDP ratios for the period 1996Q1-2008Q4 and we subject the economy to the large negative shock to leverage that was observed in 2008Q4 (see panel a) in Figure 1) under the assumption that learning agents overes-
timate the autocorrelation of the leverage shock, which is believed to be close to unity (see panel b) in Figure 1). We compare the responses of the linearized economy under adaptive learning and under rational expectations. Our typical sample of results shows that learning amplifies leverage shocks by a factor larger than three (see Figure 2). More precisely, our model predicts, when fed with the negative leverage shock of about $-5\%$ observed in 2008Q4, that output falls by about $0.8\%$, which is roughly by how much US GDP dropped at that time. In addition, aggregate consumption and the capital stock fall by about $1.1\%$ and $1.8\%$, respectively. Under rational expectations, however, output drops only by about $0.25\%$ while the responses of consumption and investment are divided by more than two at impact. Consumption and investment go down by a significantly larger margin under learning because de-leveraging is more severe: land price and debt are much more depressed after the negative leverage shock hits when its persistence is overestimated by agents who are constantly learning their environment and, because of recent past data, temporarily pessimistic. We next show that the magnitude of the consequent recession may in part be attributed to the high level of leverage (and the correspondingly high level of the debt-to-GDP ratio) observed in 2008Q4. When the same negative leverage shock occurs in the model calibrated using 1996Q1 data, when leverage was much lower, the impact on output’s response is reduced by about two thirds. In this sense, our model points at the obvious fact that financial shocks to leverage originate larger aggregate volatility in economies that are more levered.

In addition, we also ask whether procyclical leverage may act as an aggravating factor and our answer is positive. The assumption that households’ leverage responds to land price is motivated by the recent evidence provided by Mian and Sufi [35] (see also the discussion in Midrigan and Philippon [36]). The counter-factual experiment with countercyclical leverage shows dampened effects of leverage shocks, with responses of aggregate variables under learning that are close to their rational expectations coun-
terpart. One possible interpretation of this finding is that macro-prudential policies enforcing countercyclical leverage have potential stabilizing effects on the economy in the face of financial shocks, at small cost provided that non-distortionary policies are implemented (e.g. through regulation).

Our second theoretical experiment is carried out under the assumption that learning agents do not know the steady state of the economy and, in particular, that they do not know the long-run level of leverage. This is our preferred model in the sense that it is arguably a more realistic description of the difficulties that forecasting agents/econometricians face when trying to figure out the parameters governing the data generating process. In such a setting, we again feed the model with the negative leverage shock of about $-5\%$ observed in 2008Q4 and we show that the responses of the economy are further amplified under learning when agents’ belief about the mean level of leverage is overestimated (see Figure 6). Summing up the results from our two model experiments, our main conclusion is that in a world where agents overestimate the persistence of financial shocks and/or the mean level of leverage, learning amplifies the disturbances to borrowing capacity.

We next derive our set of quantitative results about the model-generated recession for 2008-10. In line with the literature (see Kiyotaki, Michaelides, Nikolov [27], Liu, Wang, Zha [32], Justiniano, Primiceri, Tombalotti [26], among others), we show that replicating the observed boom-bust pattern of land prices over the 2000s requires another source of shocks in addition to leverage shocks. We introduce a land price shock that we calibrate to ensure that the behavior of the endogenous land price matches its observed counterpart. We also feed the model with the actual innovations to leverage and show that the model predicts a sizeable fraction of the output fall observed during the Great Recession. More precisely, we do that in a setting where agents do not know the steady state and the autocorrelation matrix in the VAR representation of the economy, that they have to estimate using constant-gain learning. When we let agents revise their estimates in
reaction to the actual leverage innovations observed up to 2008, the learning model predicts a boom that is followed by a sizeable recession in 2008-10 (see Figure 10). In sharp contrast, in the 2000s the rational expectations model predicts a long recession that is followed by an expansion, which are both at odds with the data.

**Related Literature:** Our paper connects to several strands of the literature. The macroeconomic importance of financial shocks has recently been emphasized by Jermann and Quadrini [25], among others, and our paper contributes to this literature about credit shocks by showing how learning matters. Closest to ours are the papers by Adam, Kuang and Marcet [1], who focus on exogenous interest rate changes, and by Boz and Mendoza [5], who show how changes in the leverage ratio have large macroeconomic effects under Bayesian learning and Markov regime switching. As in Boz and Mendoza [5], we focus on leverage shocks but our setting is different. First, our model with adaptive learning is easily amenable to simulations and we solve for equilibria through usual linearization techniques. Because we assume that agents are adaptively learning through VAR estimation, it is possible to enrich the model by adding capital accumulation and endogenous production. Most importantly, our model predicts large output drops when the economy is hit by negative leverage shocks. In sharp contrast, absent TFP shocks, output remains constant after a financial regime switch in Boz and Mendoza [5]. In addition, we show that our results are robust to the introduction of heterogeneous agents and endogenous interest rate. Since in such setting the interest rate is endogenously procyclical, it could completely defeat the effect of an increase in credit supply even under learning. Our robustness analysis makes clear that this is not the case and that amplification due to learning does not rely upon the small-open economy assumption, an issue that is addressed neither in Adam, Kuang and Marcet [1] nor in Boz and Men-

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1 In independent research, Kuang [31] introduces learning in the original model of Kiyotaki and Moore [28] with risk neutrality and linear technologies. In contrast, utility and production functions are assumed to be concave in this paper.
doza [5]. Our paper also relates to some of the insights in Howitt [21], Hebert, Fuster and Laibson [17, 18]. Contrary to Hebert, Fuster and Laibson [17, 18] who assume that agents use a misspecified model, in our case the overestimated persistence of shocks arises endogenously under adaptive learning when agents face the sequence of financial innovations that was observed in the run-up to the crisis.\footnote{Along this dimension, we address some concerns raised by Evans [14].} In addition, our paper stresses that endogenous changes in the beliefs about the long-run level of leverage may also matter for explaining why shocks get amplified under adaptive learning. This is also where our paper departs from Ilut and Schneider [24], who do not consider learning in their setting with exogenously driven ambiguity about TFP shocks.

In the literature, the idea that procyclical leverage has adverse consequences on the macroeconomy is forthfully developed in Geanakoplos [19] (see also Cao [7]). Although our formulation of elastic leverage is derived in an admittedly simple setup, it allows us to examine its effect in a full-fledged macroeconomic setting. Last but not least, the notion that learning is important in business-cycle models when some change in the shock process occurs has been discussed by, e.g., Bullard and Duffy [6] and Williams [41]. More recently, Eusepi and Preston [13] have shown that learning matters in a standard RBC model when the economy is hit by shocks to productivity growth (see also the related papers by Edge, Laubach, Williams [12], Huang, Liu, Zha [22]). Our paper adds to this literature by focusing on financial shocks under collateral constraints. As mentioned before, part of the paper’s motivation also comes from the growing micro-evidence about the importance of households’ and firms’ leverage for understanding consumption and investment behaviors (e.g. Mian and Sufi [35], Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar [10]).

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and derives its rational expectations equilibria. Section 3 relaxes the assumption that agents form rational expectations in the short run and it shows how financial shocks are amplified under learn-
ing when agents update their estimates about the parameters of the stochastic process driving financial shocks. Section 4 shows that the model with learning predicts a sizeable recession in 2008-10 while its rational expectations counterpart does not. Section 5 gathers concluding remarks and all proofs are exposed in the appendices.

2 The Leveraged Economy with Financial Shocks

2.1 Model

The model is essentially an extension of Kocherlakota’s [29] to partial capital depreciation and adaptive learning. A representative agent solves:

$$\max E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{C_t^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1-\sigma}$$

where $C_t \geq 0$ is consumption and $\sigma \geq 0$ denotes relative risk aversion, subject to both the budget constraint:

$$C_t + K_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)K_t + T_t Q_t (L_{t+1} - L_t) + (1 + R)B_t = B_{t+1} + AK_t^\alpha L_t^\gamma$$

and the collateral constraint:

$$\tilde{\Theta}_t E_t[Q_{t+1}|L_{t+1}] \geq (1 + R)B_{t+1}$$

where $K_{t+1}$, $L_{t+1}$, and $B_{t+1}$ are the capital stock, the land stock and the amount of new borrowing, respectively, all chosen in period $t$, $Q_t$ is the land price, $R$ is the exogenous interest rate, and $A$ is the total factor productivity (TFP thereafter). In the model, leverage $\tilde{\Theta}_t$ is subject to random shocks whereas both the interest rate and TFP are constant over time.\(^3\) As we focus on financial shocks, we ignore TFP disturbances. We

\[^3\]In Section 3.3, we show that our main results are robust to the introduction to heterogeneous agents and endogenous interest rate.
also introduce a land price shock $T$, essentially because the model with only leverage
disturbances can hardly replicate the land price behavior that has been observed in the
2000s. In line with the literature (see e.g. Kiyotaki, Michaelides, Nikolov [27], Liu, Wang,
Zha [32], Justiniano, Primiceri, Tombalotti [26] among others), we find that the model
with both shocks does a better job along this dimension. Although the formulation we
use is rather agnostic, it is easy to show that it is essentially equivalent to land preference
shocks or other “political” (e.g. tax) shocks that push the demand for land and the land
price up or down. We assume that the land price shock process is $T_t = T_{t-1}^{1-\rho_T} \Psi_t$ and,
asent shocks, that it does not cause any distortions in the steady state. We present
first the results obtained under the collateral constraint (3), which follows Kiyotaki and
Moore [28]. However, quantitatively similar results hold under the margin requirement
timing stressed in Aiyagari and Gertler [3] (see Section 3.3 for robustness analysis).

Denoting $\Lambda_t$ and $\Phi_t$ the Lagrange multipliers of constraints (2) and (3), respectively,
the borrower’s first-order conditions with respect to consumption, land stock, capital
stock, and loan are given by:

$$C_t^{-\sigma} = \Lambda_t$$

$$T_t Q_t \Lambda_t = \beta E_t [T_{t+1} Q_{t+1} \Lambda_{t+1}] + \beta \gamma E_t [\Lambda_{t+1} Y_{t+1} / L_{t+1}] + \Phi_t \tilde{\Theta}_t E_t [Q_{t+1}]$$

$$\Lambda_t = \beta E_t [\Lambda_{t+1} (\alpha Y_{t+1} / K_{t+1} + 1 - \delta)]$$

$$\Lambda_t = \beta (1 + R) E_t [\Lambda_{t+1}] + (1 + R) \Phi_t.$$  

Consistent with the “shadow price learning” approach proposed by Evans and Mc
Gough [16], we keep track of the Lagrange multipliers in our Euler-equation learning
procedure. Although the analysis of nonlinear decision rules for control variables is
beyond the scope of this paper, we conjecture that Euler-equation learning is in our
setting similar to shadow-price learning when applied to the linearized model, similarly
to section 6 of Evans and McGough [16] in which is studied a simpler Ramsey economy.
We also incorporate into the model the feature that leverage responds to changes in the land price, which accords with the US micro data evidence documented by Mian and Sufi [35]. More precisely, we posit that:

\[ \bar{\Theta}_t = \Theta\left\{ \frac{E_t[Q_{t+1}]}{Q} \right\}^\varepsilon \]  

(8)

where \( Q \) is the steady-state value of land price and the log of \( \Theta_t \) follows an AR(1) process, that is, \( \Theta_t = \Theta_1 - \rho \Theta_{t-1} \Xi_t \). In Appendix A.1, we show how (8) can be derived in a simple setting with ex-post moral hazard and costly monitoring. One can think of (8) as a decomposition of the leverage into an exogenous component \( \Theta_t \) and an endogenous component \( \left\{ \frac{E_t[Q_{t+1}]}{Q} \right\}^\varepsilon \). While our qualitative results do not depend on this assumption, we set the parameter \( \varepsilon \) to a positive value in our benchmark calibration to be described later, for two main reasons: to be consistent with the evidence reported in Mian and Sufi [35] and to examine the predictions of our model under the counterfactual assumption that leverage is countercyclical.

In what follows, we assume that \( \Theta_t \) and \( T_t \) are subject to the innovations \( \Xi_t \) and \( \Psi_t \). We compare two cases regarding what agents know about the data generating process of the economy:

(i) rational expectations (with full information): agents know with certainty all the structural parameters of the model including “true” values of \( \rho_t, \rho_\theta \) and \( \bar{\Theta}_t \),

(ii) learning (with incomplete information): the exact structure of the economy and, importantly, \( \rho_t, \rho_\theta \) and \( \bar{\Theta}_t \) are unknown and agents have to learn and estimate unknown parameters based on available data. We consider two experiments which are reported in Sections 3.1 and 3.4. In Section 3.1, we first assume that the steady state is known but that learning agents do not know and have to estimate, among other parameters, the persistence parameter \( \rho_\theta \). Next, in Section 3.4, we assume that agents are uncertain about the steady state, including level of leverage \( \bar{\Theta}_t \), as well. Before turning to that, we present the benchmark case of rational expectations equilibria.
2.2 Rational Expectations Equilibria

A rational expectations competitive equilibrium is a sequence of positive prices \( \{Q_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) and positive allocations \( \{C_t, K_{t+1}, L_{t+1}, B_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) such that, given the exogenous sequence \( \{\Theta_t, T_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) of the leverage and price shocks, and the exogenous interest rate \( R \geq 0 \):

(i) \( \{C_t, K_{t+1}, L_{t+1}, B_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) satisfies the first-order conditions (4)-(7), the transversality conditions, \( \lim_{t \to \infty} \beta^t \Lambda_t L_{t+1} = \lim_{t \to \infty} \beta^t \Lambda_t K_{t+1} = 0 \), and the complementarity slackness condition \( \Phi_t \left[ \tilde{\Theta}_t E_t(Q_{t+1}) L_{t+1} - (1 + R) B_{t+1} \right] = 0 \) for all \( t \geq 0 \), where \( \tilde{\Theta}_t \equiv \Theta_t \{ E_t(Q_{t+1}) / Q \}^\varepsilon \), given the initial endowments \( L_0 \geq 0, B_0 \geq 0, K_0 \geq 0 \);

(ii) The good and land markets clear for all \( t \), that is, \( C_t + K_{t+1} - (1-\delta)K_t + (1+R)B_t = B_{t+1} + A_t K_t^\alpha \) and \( L_t = 1 \), respectively.

The above definition assumes that the interest rate is exogenous. Therefore, a natural interpretation of the model is that it represents a small, open economy. However, in Section 3.3 we show that our main results are robust to the introduction of heterogeneous agents and endogenous interest rate, in a closed-economy variant of Iacoviello’s [23] model. The details of such an extension are presented in Appendix A.3. As our focus is on how borrowers adaptively learn how the economy settles after financial shocks, we abstract both from TFP shocks and from further details regarding the lender’s side, and we focus on the small-open-economy setting as in Adam, Kuang and Marcet [1], Boz and Mendoza [5]. However, our contribution with respect to the latter is to show that amplification due to learning does not critically depend on the interest rate being exogenous.

There is a unique (deterministic) stationary equilibrium such that the credit constraint (3) binds, provided that the interest factor \( 1 + R = 1/\mu \) is such that \( \mu \in (\beta, 1) \), that is, if lenders are more patient than borrowers. This follows from the steady-state ver-
sion of (7), $\Phi = \Lambda(\mu - \beta) > 0$. The steady state is characterized by the following ratios, that fully determine the linearized dynamics around the steady state. From (5) and (6), it follows that the land price-to-GDP and capital-to-GDP ratios are given by $Q/Y = \gamma\beta/[1 - \beta - \Theta(\mu - \beta)]$ and $K/Y = \alpha\beta/[1 - \beta(1 - \delta)]$, respectively. Finally, (3) yields the debt-to-GDP ratio $B/Y = \mu\Theta Q/Y$ and (2) yields the consumption-to-GDP ratio $C/Y = 1 - \delta K/Y - (1/\mu - 1)(B/Y)$.

Appendix A.2 provides a log-linearized version in levels of the set of equations (2)-(7) defining, together with (8) and the laws of motion $\Theta_t = \Theta_1 - \rho_\theta t - \xi_t$ and $T_t = T_1 - \rho_\tau t - \Psi_t$, intertemporal equilibria. The linearized expectational system can be written as:

$$X_t = AX_{t-1} + BE_{t-1}[X_t] + CE_t[X_{t+1}] + N + D\xi_t + F\psi_t \quad (9)$$

where $X_t = (c_t, q_t, \lambda_t, \phi_t, b_t, k_t, \theta_t, \tau_t)$; $\xi_t$ and $\psi_t$ are exogenous shocks; and all variables in lowercase letters denote variables in log (e.g. $k_t \equiv \log(K_t)$). The derivation and the expressions of the 8-by-8 matrices $A$, $B$, $C$, $D$, $F$, $N$ as functions of parameters are given in Appendix A.2.

Anticipating our results on E-stability, we now use the fact that the linearized rational expectations equilibrium can be obtained as the unique E-stable Minimal-State-Variable solution (MSV thereafter) such that

$$E_{t-1}[X_t] = H^{re} + M^{re}X_{t-1}, \quad (10)$$

where $M^{re}$ and $H^{re}$ solve

$$M = [I_8 - CM]^{-1}[A + BM], \quad (11)$$

$$H = [I_8 - CM^{re}]^{-1}[BH + CH + N], \quad (12)$$

and $I_8$ is the 8-by-8 identity matrix.

It is important to underline that all parameters, including both the autocorrelation of the leverage shock process, that is, $\rho_\theta$, and the leverage level, that is $\Theta$, are known
under rational expectations. In contrast, the next sections relax such an assumption and assume instead that agents have to form estimates about $\rho_0$ and $\Theta$ using the available data.

3 Adaptive Learning and Financial Shocks

Following Marcet and Sargent [34] and Evans and Honkapohja [15], we now relax the assumption that agents form rational expectations in the short-run. We first assume that the steady state of the economy is known, which implies that the steady state level of leverage is a common knowledge. However, the parameters governing the dynamics of the economy are not known. In particular, $\rho_0$ is not known with certainty by agents. We can still use the linearized dynamic system in log levels, which is now:

$$X_t = AX_{t-1} + BE_t^*[X_t] + CE_t^*[X_{t+1}] + N + D\xi_t + F\psi_t$$  \hfill (13)

where the operator $E_t^*$ indicates expectations that are taken using all information available at $t$ but that are possibly nonrational. More precisely, agents behave as econometricians by embracing the following perceived law of motion (PLM thereafter):

$$X_t = MX_{t-1} + H + D\xi_t + F\psi_t$$  \hfill (14)

which agents use for forecasting. In particular, (14) yields $E_t[X_{t+1}] = M_{t-1}X_t + H_{t-1}$ and $E_t[X_t] = M_{t-2}X_{t-1} + H_{t-2}$. The actual law of motion (ALM thereafter) results from combining (13) and (14) which gives:

$$[I_8 - CM_{t-1}]X_t = [A + BM_{t-2}]X_{t-1} + [BH_{t-2} + CH_{t-1} + N] + D\xi_t + F\psi_t. \hfill (15)$$

When $M$ and $H$ coincide with $M^{re}$ and $H^{re}$ (as derived in Section 2.2) then agents hold rational expectations. However, beliefs captured in $M$ and $H$ may differ from
rational expectations. Following Evans and Honkapohja [15], we assume they are updated in real time using recursive learning algorithms which means that the belief matrices $M$ and $H$ are time-varying. The coefficients are updated according to

$$\Omega_t = \Omega_{t-1} + \nu_t (X_t - \Omega_{t-1} Z_{t-1}) Z_{t-1}' R_{t-1}^{-1}$$  \hspace{1cm} (16)$$

$$R_t = R_{t-1} + \nu_t (Z_t Z_{t-1}' - R_{t-1})$$  \hspace{1cm} (17)$$

where $Z_t' = [1, X_t']$ and $\Omega = [H \ M]$. $R$ is the estimate of the variance-covariance matrix and $\nu_t$ is the gain sequence (which equals $1/t$ under ordinary least squares and $\nu$ under constant gain, respectively OLS and CG thereafter). One difference with rational expectations that is key to our results is that agents’ estimates may differ from true parameter values, that is $(M_t, H_t) \neq (M^{re}, H^{re})$. This imply, for example, that agents may overestimate the autocorrelation parameter $\rho_\theta$ (or overestimate the steady state level of leverage $\bar{\Theta}$ as later explained, in Section 3.4).

The mapping from the PLM (14) into the ALM (15) is given by:

$$T_M(M, H) = \left[I_8 - CM\right]^{-1} [A + BM]$$  \hspace{1cm} (18)$$

$$T_H(M, H) = \left[I_8 - CM\right]^{-1} [BH + CH + N].$$  \hspace{1cm} (19)$$

Adapting Proposition 10.3 from Evans and Honkapohja [15], we check that all eigenvalues of $DT_M(M, H)$ and $DT_H(M, H)$ have real parts less than 1 when evaluated at the fixed-point solutions of the $T$-map (18), that is, $M = M^{re}$ and $H = H^{re}$. Using the rules for vectorization, we get:

$$DT_M(M^{re}, H^{re}) = \left([I_8 - CM^{re}]^{-1} [A + BM^{re}]\right)' \otimes [I_8 - CM^{re}]^{-1} C$$

$$+ I_8 \otimes [I_8 - CM^{re}]^{-1} B$$

$$DT_H(M^{re}, H^{re}) = [I_8 - CM^{re}]^{-1} [B + C].$$

We verify numerically that under parameterizations that we consider, the MSV solution is locally E-stable, that is, all eigenvalues of both $DT_M(M^{re}, H^{re})$ and $DT_H(M^{re}, H^{re})$...
lie within the interior of the unit circle. Because E-stability conditions hold in all simulations that we report, we conjecture that the results of Evans and Honkapohja [15] about convergence in distribution to the rational-expectations equilibrium for small enough gain values apply as well in our setting. Since our purpose is not to establish convergence results, we abstract from the analytical conditions stated in Evans and Honkapohja [15, p.165], which turn out to be quite demanding. In practice, we numerically compute the E-stable solutions by iterating the T-map (18)-(19), as described in Evans and Honkapohja [15, p.232].

3.1 Learning the Persistence of Leverage Shocks

In this section, we show that learning amplifies leverage shocks when agents’ beliefs about the model parameters are allowed to differ from rational expectations. In particular, we assume that learning agents incorrectly believe that $\rho_0$ is closer to one than the “true” value. This is meant to capture the trend in leverage that is observed in the run-up to the 2008Q4 crisis. On the other hand, we make our theoretical experiment more transparent by subjecting the model to a single source of shock and we shut down the land price shock, that is, $T_t = 1$ for all $t$.

The quarterly data on households’s debt, land holdings, land price and leverage we use are borrowed from Boz and Mendoza [5]. The model is calibrated to deliver average values for leverage, debt-to-GDP and land value-to-GDP ratios observed over the housing market “bubble” period 1996Q1-2008Q4, that is $\bar{\Theta} \approx 0.88$, $B/Y \approx 0.52$ and $QL/Y \approx 0.59$, see Table 1 for all parameter values. To calibrate those ratios, we fix the quarterly interest rate to 1% (that is, $\mu = 0.99$) and $\beta = 0.98\mu$, consistently with the literature on heterogeneous discount rates, e.g. Krusell and Smith [30], and then pick the land share $\gamma$ to target the land price-to-GDP ratio $QL/Y \approx 0.59$. Setting the
leverage mean level $\Theta \approx 0.88$ ensures that the debt-to-GDP is $B/Y \approx 0.52$ as in the data. Although leverage stationarity may appear as questionable for the 2006-09 period, it is arguably not for longer periods in the data and also in theory. In addition, we take the value $\varepsilon = 0.5$ from the estimates of Mian and Sufi [35, Table 2, column 6], who regress leverage growth on house price growth. Finally, the standard deviation of the innovations to leverage, that is, $\sigma_\xi$, comes from the OLS estimate over the whole sample period. In all the simulations reported below, we have checked numerically that the borrowing constraint is always binding.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\mu$</th>
<th>$\beta$</th>
<th>$\delta$</th>
<th>$\alpha$</th>
<th>$\gamma$</th>
<th>$\Theta$</th>
<th>$\sigma$</th>
<th>$\varepsilon$</th>
<th>$\nu$</th>
<th>$\sigma_\xi$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.0075</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The experiment that produces our first set of results is the following. We assume that in the period preceding the financial collapse of 2008Q4, the agents in our model economy have learned that $\rho_\theta$ was close to one, reflecting the leverage trend that starts in the early 1990s. This means that agents’ beliefs encapsulated in matrix $M$ of the PLM (14) reflect that $\rho_\theta \approx 1$. Then in 2008Q4 a large negative shock to leverage of about $-5\%$ happens (see Figure 1). The (pseudo-)impulse response functions in Figure 2 report the reaction of the economy’s aggregates under the assumptions that agents wrongly believe that $\rho_\theta \approx 0.998$ whereas the true value is 0.976. Such a calibration is consistent with both the CG and OLS estimates in 2008Q4 obtained from the data, as shown in panel b) of Figure 1 (see also Figure 9 in Section 4). More precisely, panel b) in Figure 1 shows that $\rho_\theta \approx 0.998$ in 2008Q3, which is the value that learning agents use to forecast 2008Q4. To initialize the model, we simulate a million times the RE model calibrated |\footnote{The value we choose for $\varepsilon$ implies, for instance, that a 10% increase in land price triggers a 5% increase in leverage, which under our calibration would raise leverage from 0.88 to about 0.92.}
according to Table 1, using $M^{re}$, $H^{re}$, and we estimate the variance-covariance matrix $R$ that is used as initial condition to generate the impulse responses under learning.5

The blue dotted line in Figure 2 represents the RE equilibrium with $\rho_{\theta} = 0.976$. The solid red curve in Figure 2 occurs when agents gradually learn using (16)-(17) under the initial belief that $\rho_{\theta} = 0.998$, with the true value being 0.976. Although Figure 2 assumes CG learning with $\nu = 0.013$, similar results would occur with values that belong to $(0.005, 0.04)$ (which would imply similar effects at impact but slower or faster recovery).6 Such a low value for the gain parameter implies that learning agents regress past data using a forgetting half-length of about 13 years, that is, data older than 13 years are weighted less than 50%.

Figure 2 shows that the negative leverage shock is significantly amplified under learning. In all figures, the numbers reported on the $y$-axis are in percentage terms. For example, Figure 2 reports that the output fall in period two is about $-0.82\%$ under learning and about $-0.27\%$ under rational expectations. In particular, the impact on output and capital is roughly three times larger and the consumption drop is multiplied by about four compared to the rational expectations outcome. This follows from the fact that deleveraging is much more severe under learning: the fall in land price is more than four times larger and the debt decrease is multiplied by more than two compared to RE.7

---

5The learning model is stable enough that in this exercise we do not need to make use of any projection facility.

6Our chosen value for the gain parameter is conservative, as it falls within the lower range of estimates reported in Branch and Evans [4], Chakraborty and Evans [9], Milani [37, 38], and it is consistent with the estimates of Malmendier and Nagel [33] for younger generations. Although there seems to be no empirical estimate of the gain parameter corresponding to actual forecasts of housing or land prices, the dataset exploited in Pancrazi and Pietrunti [39] could in principle be used to that purpose.

7In Figure 2, debt falls by much more than output. This implies that the debt-to-GDP ratio - a common definition of aggregate leverage - falls by a large amount as well.
In summary, because agents incorrectly believe that the negative leverage shock will be *very persistent*, they expect a much tighter future borrowing constraint leading to a much larger fall in land price and than under rational expectations. Agents are pessimistic due to incorrect beliefs and this pessimism depresses consumption, investment and output much more than under rational expectations.
Figure 2: Responses (in Percentage Deviations from Steady State) to a −5% Leverage Shock under Learning (Red Solid Line) and Rational Expectations (Blue Dotted Line); Parameter Values in Table 1.
To measure how the leverage level matters for the response to a financial shock, we now calibrate the model using data from the first quarter of 1996 and set $\Theta \approx 0.73$ (the other values are as in Table 1), which leads to $B/Y \approx 0.34$ and $QL/Y \approx 0.48$. According to most measures, this corresponds to the starting point of the housing price “bubble”. The lower level of leverage implies that both the debt-to-GDP and the land value-to-GDP are correspondingly lower than their averages over the 1996Q1-2008Q4 period. Figure 3 replicates the same experiment as above, when a $-5\%$ shock to leverage hits the economy and $\rho_\theta$ is believed to equal 0.998 while its true value is 0.976. Direct comparison of Figures 2 and 3 reveals that higher leverage increases the effect of the
Figure 3: Responses (in Percentage Deviations from Steady State) to a $-5\%$ Leverage Shock (Learning: Red Solid Line; Rational Expectations: Blue Dotted Line) when $\bar{\Theta} = 0.73$ (Other Parameter Values in Table 1)

shock on aggregates by about 150% at impact under learning. In this sense, the larger the level of leverage the deeper the recession that follows after a negative financial shock.\(^8\)

\(^8\)Output’s response and capital’s response are proportional so we report only the former and not the latter.
It is important to stress that the economy’s responses to a leverage shock are larger under learning because the land price forecast interacts with the borrowing constraint. To illustrate this fact, we now report the responses of a subset of the same variables when the land price is assumed to be fixed in the borrowing constraint, that is, when (3) is replaced by:

$$\Theta_t Q_{t+1} \geq (1 + R)B_{t+1}$$  \hspace{1cm} (20)

while it is allowed to respond according to the Euler condition (5). One possible interpretation of (20) is that expected land price is predetermined and fixed at its steady-state value when lenders evaluate the collateral value and decide how much to lend. Figure
4 reports the responses of output and consumption, which are about the same under learning and under rational expectations, in contrast to Figure 2. This unambiguously shows that it is the interaction of land price expectations with the borrowing constraint that generates our results under learning.

Figure 4: Responses (in Percentage Deviations from Steady State) to a $-5\%$ Leverage Shock with Fixed Land Price (Learning: Red Solid Line; Rational Expectations: Blue Dotted Line); Parameter Values in Table 1.
3.2 Simple Macroprudential Policy

In this section, we show that countercyclical leverage dampens the impact of leverage shocks under learning. We now ask the counter-factual question: what would be the reaction of the economy to the same shock, under the same parameter values but with the leverage being now mildly countercyclical?\(^9\) More precisely, we assume that \(\varepsilon = -0.5\) while the other parameters are kept unchanged and set as in Table 1. The economy’s responses are reported in Figure 5. The comparison of Figures 2 and 5 shows that countercyclical leverage dampens by a significant margin the responses to financial shocks and it brings learning dynamics closer to its rational expectations counterpart. As a consequence, a much smaller recession follows a negative leverage shock: though agents anticipate a too large deleveraging effect because they overestimate the persistence of the adverse leverage shock, the land price fall now triggers an increase in countercyclical leverage, which dampens the impact of the negative shock. In other words, the negative shock to the exogenous component of leverage is now dampened by an increase of the endogenous part, which is itself triggered by a fall in land price. As a consequence, borrowing falls only moderately and the resulting recession is much smaller and similar under learning and under RE.

\(^9\)This feature could possibly be enforced by appropriate regulation of credit markets. Alternatively, Appendix A.1 shows how it arises if government uses procyclical taxes.
Figure 5: Responses (in Percentage Deviations from Steady State) to a −5% Leverage Shock under Countercyclical Leverage (Learning: Red Solid Line; Rational Expectations: Blue Dotted Line); $\varepsilon = -0.5$ and other Parameter Values in Table 1.
3.3 Robustness Under Alternative Assumptions

To assess the robustness of the findings reported in Section 3.1, we now relax several assumptions one by one. First, we depart from logarithmic utility and we allow risk aversion ($\sigma$) to take on values that are larger or smaller than one. Second, we adopt the timing assumption that is implied by the margin requirement interpretation of the borrowing constraint (Aiyagari and Gertler [3]). That is, borrowing is limited to the current market value of collateral, as opposed to tomorrow’s market value. In other words, we replace both (3) by $\tilde{\Theta}_t Q_t L_{t+1} \geq (1 + R) B_{t+1}$ and (8) by $\tilde{\Theta}_t \equiv \Theta_t \{Q_t/Q\}^\xi$. We
also relax the small-open economy assumption and introduce heterogeneous agents and endogenous interest rate. Finally, we examine the impact of assuming elastic leverage on our results.

In Table 2, we report the output amplification that obtains under learning, as a fraction of that under rational expectations. For example, the impact of a $-5\%$ leverage shock on output’s deviation (from its steady-state value, in percentage terms) is about $-0.82\%$ under learning and $-0.27\%$ under RE (see Figure 2) when parameters are set according to Table 1. Therefore, the first column of Table 2 reports that the ratio is about $3.09 \approx 0.82/0.27$. Similarly, the second and third columns of Table 2 report such a ratio when all parameter values are set according to Table 1, except for risk aversion $\sigma$ which equals $0.5$ and $3$, respectively. The fourth column in Table 2 reports the ratio in the margin requirement model. The fifth column in Table 2 reports relative output amplification in a closed-economy version of the model with heterogeneous agents and endogenous interest rate (see Appendix A.3 for modeling details). Finally, the last column reports amplification when the procyclicality of leverage is shut down, that is, when $\varepsilon = 0$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benchmark</th>
<th>$\sigma = 0.5$</th>
<th>$\sigma = 3$</th>
<th>Margin</th>
<th>Heterogeneous</th>
<th>$\varepsilon = 0$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Direct inspection of Table 2 shows that our main findings are robust both to changes in the utility function’s curvature and to an alternative timing assumption. Output amplification is quantitatively similar across different models and this turns out to be the case for the other variables (not reported) as well. In addition, how the numbers change in Table 2 accords with intuition. First, under the timing assumed in (3), incorrect beliefs about the economy further amplify shocks because land price forecasts are temporarily deviating from RE. In the margin model where the borrowing limit depends on
today’s collateral market values so that forecast errors are slightly less important during
deleveraging episodes. In addition, smaller risk aversion implies that consumption will
fall by more and, therefore, that investment will fall by less at impact, which means that
output will also fall by (slightly) less under learning compared to rational expectations.
Although output amplification due to learning falls in the closed-economy variant, it is
still substantial.

To stress that initial beliefs about the persistence of the leverage process are important
for our results, we now report the amplification that comes from the self-referentiality of
learning alone, without the assumption that agents over-estimate persistence. To com-
pare the volatility under learning relative to rational-expectations we proceed as follows.
The learning model is initialized with the beliefs centered at the REE, simulated for
400 periods to allow estimates to converge to its long-run distribution and, finally, run
next for 60 quarters to assess the volatility of endogenous variables under learning. Ta-
ble 3 reports those volatilities. More precisely, the numbers in Table 3 shows the ratio
of variances of deviations from steady state, under alternative values of the CG gain.
Comparison of Tables 2 and 3 makes clear why our amplification results depend on the
assumption that $\rho_{\theta}$ is overestimated under learning. When learning agents are assumed to
know the true value of leverage persistence, amplification is modest, especially if the gain
parameter is not large. We also use those stochastic simulations to assess the frequency
of values for $\rho_{\theta}$ that are larger than or equal to 0.998, which is our calibrated value. This
rare event has a non-negligeable frequency of half a percent in the benchmark scenario
such that $\nu = 0.013$. This means that such high values for persistence would be observed
on average every 50 years. This frequency goes up to about 19% if $\nu = 0.04$ which means
that beliefs of close-to-unit-root persistence would be observed on average every 1.25
year.
Table 3. Amplification Factor Under Learning Alone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Benchmark: $\nu = 0.013$</th>
<th>$\nu = 0.005$</th>
<th>$\nu = 0.04$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.020</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.020</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.040</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land price</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.040</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.035</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.4 Learning the Mean Level of Leverage

The purpose of this section is to report the outcome of our second experiment. We now subject the economy to the same shock that was considered in Section 3.1 but we assume that agents overestimate both the leverage shocks’ persistence and the mean leverage level. That is, agents believe that $\rho_\theta = 0.998$ while the true value is 0.976. We also set the RE value $\overline{\theta} = 0.88$ just as in Table 1 and we assume learning agents believe that $\overline{\theta} = 0.966$, which is the value of leverage in the data at the peak of the land price “bubble” in 2007Q2.
Figure 6: Responses (in Percentage Deviations from the RE Steady State) to a $-5\%$ Leverage Shock (Learning: Red Solid Line; Rational Expectations: Blue Dotted Line);

Parameter Values as in Table 1 and Belief set to $\Theta = 0.966$
The responses of our set of variables to a $-5\%$ shock to leverage are reported in Figure 6, which features substantially larger deviations under CG learning compared to the RE benchmark. The fall in output under CG learning is more than 7 times larger than that under RE, compared to 3 times in Figure 2. Overestimating the mean level of leverage on top of its persistence adds a extra kick to the amplification mechanism that arises under learning. Taken together, our two experiments suggest that learning amplifies negative shocks to leverage such as the one observed in 2008Q4. A natural question that we now ask is whether or not the learning model accords better with the actual

10Alternatively, setting $\varepsilon = 0$ implies that the relative output amplification is about 2.2 under learning, compared to about 1.5 according to Table 2 when learning agents know the long-run leverage level.
path followed by the US output over the Great Recession than its rational expectations counterpart.

4 Does Learning Help Account For The Great Recession?

The purpose of this section is to argue that learning is a plausible mechanism that helps explaining the magnitude of the Great Recession. More precisely, we now show that the learning model predicts both a boom in the early 2000s and a sizeable recession beginning 2007Q3, while the model with rational expectations generates a fall in output up to 2007Q3 followed by an expansion which are both at odds with the data. All parameter values are set according to Table 1 and we calibrate the land price i.i.d. shocks so as to replicate the observed path for land price, as shown in Figure 7.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{11}Although we set $\rho_t$ to zero, similar results obtain when the land price shock process has some autocorrelation.
To derive leverage shocks, we use the data provided by Boz and Mendoza [5] for the period 1975Q1-2010Q1 to decompose the exogenous and endogenous components of leverage using definition (8). That is, we obtain the exogenous component $\Theta_t$ by removing the part of the leverage that is explained by land price. We then estimate AR(1) processes on the log of $\Theta_t$ both under CG and under OLS and we compute the residuals from such estimated processes that we use to feed our model with.\(^{12}\) The resulting innovations, reported in Figure 8, do not significantly differ, which indicates that our results derived below do not rely on disturbances being different under learning and under rational expectations.

Figure 8 makes clear why the model is unable to explain the Great Recession when fed with only the actual leverage innovations: the fall in land price that starts in early 2007 generates positive shocks in 2007 and 2008 that produce a large expansion that is hardly reversed when the negative shock happens in 2008Q4. Consistent with the literature, we find that the model requires another source of disturbance to accord with the data and

\(^{12}\)We have also checked that ARMA processes do not better describe our $\varepsilon$-adjusted data on leverage.
this is why we use i.i.d. land price shocks to replicate the observed land price behavior as shown in Figure 7.

Figure 9 reports the OLS and CG estimates of $\rho_\theta$ for the period 2000Q1-2010Q1. The OLS estimate is obtained from a univariate regression using the data over sample period 1975Q1-2010Q1. This is consistent with the notion that RE agents know the process governing leverage. The CG estimate is obtained from the VAR estimation when learning agents use the full model to forecast and update their beliefs in real time. Figure 9 partly replicates panel b) of Figure 1, to which we also add the OLS estimate which is $\rho_\theta \approx 0.976$. Although Figure 9 may seem to imply that learning does not converge to rational expectations, it does so in the whole sample period and also in theory, as the CG estimates converge in distribution to the RE estimates.

Figure 9 shows that learning agents overestimate the autocorrelation parameter consistently over the 2000s and, more importantly, that their estimate drifts toward unit root. In particular, the model predicts that the VAR estimate of $\rho_\theta$ is around 0.998 in 2008Q3 (which is the value agents are assumed to use in Section 3.1 to make forecast
about 2008Q4) and 1.002 in 2008Q4, before falling slightly below one. This means that when the negative leverage shock of 2008Q4 occurs, learning agents think of leverage as essentially having unit root and they expect any innovations at that time to be close to permanent. As a consequence, deleveraging is much more severe than what would happen under RE and the resulting outcome is reported in Figure 10.

Figure 10 shows that the model predicts a sizeable recession during the Great Recession period, with a fall in output about 1% between 2007Q3 and 2010Q1 and a significant boom prior to that. Although the learning model explains only about 20% of the actual output drop reported by the NBER to be about 5%, it does much better than the RE model. The latter predicts a continuous fall in output from 2000 to 2007 followed by a significant expansion over the 2007-2010 period, both features being at odds with the data. The major reason behind such a stark contrast is that the RE model does not allow for belief revision, while the latter feature precisely explains why learning agents were overestimating the impact of the negative leverage shock in 2008Q4 and why this leads to a sizeable output fall at that time in the model. We should also stress that setting $\nu = 0.013$ is a rather conservative assumption and that choosing a larger value for the gain parameter would imply a bigger recession in the learning model. Given that the model is overly too simple to fully account for the data, our main claim here is that the learning model explains a sizeable fraction of the Great Recession, while the RE model does not.\(^\text{13}\)

In view of our theoretical results on countercyclical leverage reported in Section 3.2, it is natural to ask whether the fact that leverage is procyclical aggravates the recession, which is what intuition suggests. As a counter-factual, Figure 11 reports the output response that occurs under mildly countercyclical leverage, with $\varepsilon = -0.5$ (implying that a 10% fall in land price increases leverage by 5%). Comparing Figures 10 and 11 suggests

\(^{13}\)Under the assumption that $\varepsilon = 0$, the fall in output is still larger than half of a percentage point.
Figure 10: Model-Generated Great Recession (Constant-Gain Learning: Red Solid Line; Rational Expectations: Blue Dotted Line)

Output, Consumption and Debt Responses Over Time (% Deviations From 2007Q4)
that a simple macroprudential policy may substantially attenuate the impact of leverage shocks on aggregates under learning. In Figure 11, output is in 2010Q1 at about the same level than that in 2007Q4.

5 Conclusion

A large part of business-cycle theory relies on the assumption that agents know all parameters governing the stochastic process underlying the disturbances that hit the economy. This paper has shown how relaxing such an assumption in a simple model predicts that the economy’s aggregates respond very differently to financial shocks when agents are gradually learning their environment, compared to rational expectations. More specifically, our theoretical experiments with a calibrated model suggest that reasonable parameter configurations can lead to much larger amplification of the impact of shocks to leverage. This is for instance the case when learning agents overestimate either the
autocorrelation parameter governing the persistence of leverage shocks or the long-run level of leverage. We have provided evidence that both cases are not inconsistent with the US data prior to the Great Recession, when borrowers probably believed that credit collateralized by real estate assets was being extended by the financial sector. In addition, the more empirically oriented counterparts of our two theoretical experiments are informative about which assumption better stands against the data. Our preferred model with agents updating their estimates of the long-run level of leverage and of leverage persistence as new data arrive is not unsuccessful in that respect. In particular, it predicts a sizeable fall in output from peak to trough, as reported by the NBER, whereas the rational expectations model predicts a continued, counter-factual expansion in 2008 and 2009. Our analysis could of course be extended to incorporate other margins (e.g. capacity utilization, labor hours) and would be useful to measure the contribution of learning in middle-scale models like that proposed by Christiano, Eichenbaum, Trabandt [11].

We believe that the main results of this paper may also be relevant for studying other settings. For example, they are suggestive about how one could try to measure to what extent unemployment variations are driven by beliefs formed by firms about either the persistence of demand shocks or the steady-state level of demand, or both. Monetary policy perhaps provides still another example in which the beliefs formed by the private sector about the persistence or about the long-run stance of monetary policy matter, in particular when the economy hits the zero lower bound, as they could change the effects of policy on the economy. These are but a few examples for which extensions of the setting used in this paper could lead to fruitful research. In the same vein, another potential avenue for future research would be to model how perceptions about the process driving uncertainty shocks affect how those shocks propagate in the real economy. This requires solving higher-order approximations of nonlinear models and we believe this calls for further inquiries.
A Appendix

A.1 Elastic Leverage: Simple Micro-Foundations

This section derives some simple micro-foundations for the assumption of elastic leverage captured in (8). The case when leverage is procyclical (that is, \( \varepsilon > 0 \)) obtains in a setting with ex-post moral hazard and costly monitoring similar to Aghion et al. [2, p.1391]. Suppose that the borrower has wealth \( QL \) and has access to investment opportunities, which can be financed by credit in the amount \( B \). If the borrower repays next period, his income is \( I - (1 + R)B \), where \( I \) is whatever income was generated by investing. If the borrower defaults next period, his income is now \( I - pQL \), assuming that he loses his collateral with some probability \( p \), which represents for example the frequency of foreclosures. Strategic default is avoided provided that \( I - (1 + R)B \geq I - pQL \), that is, if \( pQL \geq (1 + R)B \). The lender incurs a cost \( C(p)L \) when collecting collateral, with \( C'(p) > 0 \) and \( C''(p) > 0 \), and he chooses the optimal monitoring policy by solving:

\[
\max_p pQL - C(p)L
\]

which gives \( Q = C'(p) \). The higher the land price, the larger the incentives to increase effort to collect collateral. Assuming now that the cost function is \( C(p) = \phi p^{1+1/\varepsilon}/(1+1/\varepsilon) \), with \( \varepsilon > 0 \), gives that \( p = (Q/\phi)^{\varepsilon} \). Setting the scaling parameter \( \phi = Q^*\Theta^{-1/\varepsilon} \), where \( Q^* \) is steady-state land value and \( \Theta \) is leverage, gives (8). Therefore, ex-post moral hazard leads to procyclical leverage.

In contrast, countercyclical leverage obtains if government implements procyclical taxes as follows. Suppose now that the lender gets \( (1 - \tau)pQL - C(p)L \) when monitoring, where \( 1 \geq \tau \geq 0 \) is the tax rate. Under the assumption that the cost function is isoelastic, the optimal \( p \) is now \( p = ((1 - \tau)Q/\phi)^{\varepsilon} \). If the government sets time-varying taxes such that \( 1 - \tau = (Q/\phi)^{-\eta/\varepsilon - 1} \), for some \( \eta \geq 0 \), then it follows that \( p = (Q/\phi)^{-\eta} \)
and that leverage is countercyclical. Note that this happens provided that the tax rate goes up when the land price goes up.

### A.2 Log-Linearized Model in Levels

We now derive the log-linearized version of the set of equations (2)-(7) defining, together with the laws of motion of leverage $\Theta_t = \Theta^{\rho_\theta} \Theta^{\rho_\theta}_{t-1} \Xi_t$ and of land price shock $T_t = T^{\rho_\tau}_{t-1} \Psi_t$, intertemporal equilibria near steady state. In all equations below, lowercase letters denote logs and $\tilde{x}_t$ denotes the log of $X_t / X$, where $X_t$ is the steady-state value of $X_t$. For example, $\tilde{k}_t \equiv k_t - k$, with $k_t = \log(K_t)$ and $k = \log(K)$, so that lowercase variables without time subscript are steady-state levels in log. Eliminating from the other equations $\Phi_t$ by using (7), one gets the following linearized equations corresponding to (2)-(7) and the exogenous states’ transition equations, respectively:

\[
\begin{align*}
K \tilde{k}_t - \frac{B}{Y} \tilde{b}_t &= -C \tilde{c}_{t-1} - \frac{(1+R)B}{Y} \tilde{b}_{t-1} + \left( \alpha + (1 - \delta) \frac{K}{Y} \right) \tilde{k}_{t-1} \\
\tilde{b}_t &= (1 + \varepsilon) E_{t-1}[\tilde{q}_t] + \tilde{\theta}_{t-1} \\
\tilde{c}_t &= -\tilde{\lambda}_t / \sigma \\
\tilde{q}_t + \tilde{\tau}_t + \tilde{\lambda}_t (1 - \mu \Theta) &= \beta E_t[\tilde{\tau}_{t+1}] + E_t[\tilde{q}_{t+1}] \left( \beta + \Theta (1 + \varepsilon) (\mu - \beta) \right) \\
&+ E_t[\tilde{\lambda}_{t+1}] \left( \beta (1 - \Theta) + \gamma \beta \frac{Y}{Q} \right) \\
&+ \alpha \gamma \beta \frac{Y}{Q} E_t[\tilde{k}_{t+1}] + \theta_t \Theta (\mu - \beta) \\
\tilde{\lambda}_t &= E_t[\tilde{\lambda}_{t+1}] \left( \beta (1 - \delta) + \alpha \beta \frac{Y}{K} \right) + \alpha \beta (\alpha - 1) \frac{Y}{K} E_t[\tilde{k}_{t+1}] \\
(\mu - \beta) \tilde{\phi}_t &= \mu \tilde{\lambda}_t - \beta E_t[\tilde{\lambda}_{t+1}] \\
\tilde{\theta}_t &= \rho \tilde{\theta}_{t-1} + \xi_t \\
\tilde{\tau}_t &= \rho \tilde{\tau}_{t-1} + \psi_t
\end{align*}
\]
where $\tilde{\tau}_t = \log(T_t) = \tau_t$ as the steady state value of $T_t$ is set to one by assumption.

Define $P'_t \equiv (b_t, k_t, \theta_t, \tau_t)$ and $S'_t = (c_t, q_t, \lambda_t, \phi_t)$ the vectors of predetermined and jump variables in log, respectively. Then equations (22)-(28) can be decomposed into two subsystems, each pertaining to $P_t$ and $S_t$. The first block composed of (22), (23), (28) and (29) can be written:

$$M_0 P_t = M_1 S_{t-1} + M_2 E_{t-1} [S_t] + M_3 P_{t-1} + N_0 + V_1 \xi_t + V_2 \psi_t$$

(30)

where:

$$M_0 = \begin{pmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
-\frac{B}{Y} & K & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 1
\end{pmatrix},
M_1 = \begin{pmatrix}
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
-\frac{C}{Y} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0
\end{pmatrix},
M_2 = \begin{pmatrix}
0 & 1 + \varepsilon & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0
\end{pmatrix},$$

$$M_3 = \begin{pmatrix}
0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
-(1 + R) \frac{B}{Y} & \alpha + (1 - \delta) \frac{K}{Y} & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \rho_{\theta} & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & \rho_{\tau}
\end{pmatrix},
N_0 = \begin{pmatrix}
b - (1 + \varepsilon) q - \theta \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0
\end{pmatrix},$$

and $V_1' = (0, 0, 1, 0), V_2' = (0, 0, 0, 1)$.

The second block (24)-(27) can be written:

$$M_4 S_t = M_5 E_t [S_{t+1}] + M_6 P_t + M_7 E_t [P_{t+1}] + N_1$$

(31)

where:

$$M_4 = \begin{pmatrix}
0 & 1 & 1 - \mu \overline{\Theta} & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
\sigma & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & -\mu & \mu - \beta
\end{pmatrix},
M_5 = \begin{pmatrix}
0 & \beta + \overline{\Theta} (1 + \varepsilon) (\mu - \beta) & \beta (1 - \overline{\Theta}) + \gamma \beta \frac{Y}{K} & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \beta (1 - \delta) + \alpha \beta \frac{Y}{K} & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & -\beta
\end{pmatrix},$$
\[ M_6 = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & \Theta(\mu - \beta) & -1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}, \quad M_7 = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & \alpha\gamma Y Q & 0 & \beta \\ 0 & \alpha(\alpha - 1) Y K & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}, \]

\[ N_1 = \begin{pmatrix} q(1 - \beta - \Theta(1 + \varepsilon)(\mu - \beta)) + \lambda(1 - \Theta(1 - \beta) - \beta\gamma Y Q) - \alpha\gamma Y Q k - \Theta(\mu - \beta)\theta \\ \lambda(1 - \beta(1 - \delta) - \alpha\gamma Y Q) - \alpha(\alpha - 1) Y K k \\ c + \frac{\lambda}{\delta} \\ (\mu - \beta)(\phi - \lambda) \end{pmatrix}. \]

Finally, substituting the expression of \( P_t \) from (30) in (31) and piling up the resulting two blocks of equations allows one to rewrite the system as:

\[ X_t = AX_{t-1} + BE_{t-1}[X_t] + CE_t[X_{t+1}] + N + D\xi_t + F\psi_t \quad (32) \]

where \( X'_t = \text{vec}(S'_t, P'_t) \) and:

\[ A = \begin{pmatrix} M_4^{-1}M_6M_0^{-1}M_4 & M_4^{-1}M_6M_0^{-1}M_3 \\ M_0^{-1}M_1 & M_0^{-1}M_3 \end{pmatrix}, \quad B = \begin{pmatrix} M_4^{-1}M_6M_0^{-1}M_2 & O_4 \\ M_0^{-1}M_2 & O_4 \end{pmatrix}, \]

\[ C = \begin{pmatrix} M_4^{-1}M_5 & M_4^{-1}M_7 \\ O_4 & O_4 \end{pmatrix}, \quad D = \begin{pmatrix} M_4^{-1}M_6M_0^{-1}V_1 \\ M_0^{-1}V_1 \end{pmatrix}, \quad F = \begin{pmatrix} M_4^{-1}M_6M_0^{-1}V_2 \\ M_0^{-1}V_2 \end{pmatrix}, \]

\[ N = \begin{pmatrix} M_4^{-1}N_1 + M_4^{-1}M_6M_0^{-1}N_0 \\ M_0^{-1}N_0 \end{pmatrix}, \]

where \( O_4 \) is a 4-by-4 zeroes matrix.

### A.3 Extension: Closed-Economy Model with Constant Interest Rate

The purpose of this appendix is to show that, similar to the open-economy model developed in Section 2, learning generates amplification in a closed-economy version with domestic borrowers and lenders and endogenous interest rate.
Let us now assume that lenders are domestic agents (instead of foreign countries as in Section 2), whose unique role is to provide loans to borrowers. Following Iacoviello [23], lenders derive utility from consumption and land holdings, and they get interest income from last period’s loan payments. As discussed in Pintus and Wen [40], lenders may be interpreted as financial intermediaries. The representative lender solves:

$$\max E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \mu^t \left\{ \left( C_t \right)^{1-\sigma_c} - \frac{1}{1-\sigma_c} + \psi \left( L_t \right)^{1-\sigma_l} - \frac{1}{1-\sigma_l} \right\}$$

(33)

with $\sigma_c$, $\sigma_l$, $\psi$ all strictly greater than zero and $\mu \in (0, 1)$, subject to the budget constraint:

$$C_t + Q_t(L_{t+1} - L_t) + B_{t+1} = (1 + R_t)B_t$$

(34)

where $C_t$ and $L_t$ denotes the lender’s consumption and land holdings, respectively, $Q_t$ is the land price, $B_{t+1}$ is the new loan. The interest rate $R_t$ is now endogenous and it is determined by the equality between the demand and supply of loans.

The first-order conditions obtained from (33)-(34) with respect to consumption, land, and lending are, respectively:

$$\left( C_t \right)^{-\sigma_c} = \chi_t$$

(35)

$$\chi_t Q_t = \mu E_t[\chi_{t+1}Q_{t+1}] + \mu \psi (L_{t+1})^{-\sigma_l}$$

(36)

$$\chi_t = \mu E_t[\chi_{t+1}(1 + R_{t+1})]$$

(37)

where $\chi_t$ is the Lagrange multiplier of constraint (34) in period $t$.

Assuming that lenders’ utility is linear in consumption (that is, $\sigma_c = 0$), one gets from (35) that in any rational expectations equilibrium $\chi_t = 1$ for all $t \geq 0$ so that, in view of (37), the interest factor is constant and given by $1 + R = 1/\mu$. As in the small-open economy model developed in Section 2, the interest rate is constant and the land price moves over time.

The borrower side of the model is still described by (1), (2) and (3), as in Section
2, with the addition that the total amount of land is now divided between lenders and borrowers according to:

\[ L_t + L^l_t = \bar{L} \]

where \( \bar{L} \) is the fixed supply of land. How exactly is land divided depends on both the sequence of land price and the lender’s preferences, as reflected in the first-order condition (36). In addition, the representative borrower’s first-order conditions are given by (4)-(7). As in Section 2, if \( \mu \in (\beta, 1) \), then the borrower’s credit constraint (3) is binding. Therefore, the main difference is that the closed-economy model allows some reallocation of land from lenders to borrowers when a shock hits the economy. This is why collateral constraints generate boom-bust patterns even when both the land price and the interest rate are constant over time (see Pintus and Wen [40] for a complete analysis). Under our calibration (see Table 1), however, the effect of land reallocation is quantitatively unimportant because the land share \( \gamma \) is reasonably small. To ease comparison with Figure 2, Figure 12 reports the response of output in the model when the endogenous interest rate is constant (that is, when \( \sigma_c = 0 \)). Output amplification is more than twice larger under learning, compared to rational expectations. When the lender’s utility for consumption no longer exhibits risk neutrality, output amplification remains much larger under learning provided that \( \sigma_c \) is not too large. For example, if we assume that the lender is less risk averse than the borrower and that \( \sigma_c = 0.5 \), output amplification is almost twice as big under learning. Such robustness reflects the well-known result that in this class of models, the borrowing interest rate is not much volatile if the lender’s utility function is between linear and logarithmic. It follows that amplification due to learning arises as long as lenders are not too risk averse.
Figure 12: Output Response (in Percentage Deviations from Steady State) to a −5% Leverage Shock under Learning (Red Solid Line) and Rational Expectations (Blue Dotted Line) in Model with Heterogeneous Agents and Endogenous Interest Rate; Parameter Values in Table 1.

A.4 Learning Procedure of VAR Model

A.4.1 VAR Estimation

Denoting $X_t' = \text{vec}(S_t', P_t')$ the system can be written as before:

$$X_t = AX_{t-1} + BE_{t-1}[X_t] + CE_t[X_{t+1}] + N + D\xi_t + F\psi_t$$ \hspace{1cm} (38)

where $A$, $B$, $C$, $D$, $F$ and $N$ are given in Appendix A.2. The rational expectations solution has a VAR form:

$$X_t = MX_{t-1} + H + G\xi_t + J\psi_t.$$ \hspace{1cm} (39)

Given this form of equilibrium, the law of motion of endogenous variables can be repre-
sented using $E_{t-1}X_t = MX_{t-1} + H$ and $E_tX_{t+1} = MX_t + H$ as:

$$X_t = AX_{t-1} + B[MX_{t-1} + H] + C[MX_t + H] + N + D\xi_t + F\psi_t, \quad (40)$$

or

$$X_t = [I - CM]^{-1}[A + BM]X_{t-1} + [I - CM]^{-1}[BH + CH + N] + [I - CM]^{-1}[D\xi_t + F\psi_t],$$

Matrices $M$ and $H$ are given by:

$$M = [I - CM]^{-1}[A + BM] \quad (41)$$

$$H = [I - CM]^{-1}[BH + CH + N]. \quad (42)$$

To estimate the VAR we represent the model as

$$X_t = \Omega Z_{t-1} + \Sigma_t, \quad (43)$$

where $Z'_{t-1} = [1', X_{t-1}']$ and $\Omega = [H \quad M]$.

The estimator for $\Omega$ equals

$$\hat{\Omega} = ZZ'(ZZ')^{-1}, \quad (44)$$

and its time $T$ estimates, $\hat{\Omega}_T$, can be computed from

$$\hat{\Omega}_T = \left(\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=2}^{T} X_t Z'_{t-1}\right) \left(\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=2}^{T} Z_{t-1}Z'_{t-1}\right)^{-1}. \quad (45)$$

The recursive OLS updating takes form of

$$\hat{\Omega}_{T+1} = \hat{\Omega}_T + \frac{1}{T+1} \left(X_{T+1} - \hat{\Omega}_T Z_T\right)Z'_T R_{T+1}^{-1} \quad (46)$$

and

$$R_{T+1} = R_T + \frac{1}{T+1} (Z_TZ'_T - R_T). \quad (47)$$
Equations (47) and (46) show how the estimates of matrix $\Omega$ are updated as new data become available. In the above expression, $X_{T+1} - \hat{\Omega}_T Z_T$ corresponds to a forecast error made using last period estimates. Under constant gain updating, the weight $1/(T + 1)$ is replaced by the gain parameter $\nu$.

### A.4.2 Learning

Assume agents re-estimate the consistency with the RE model each period and use their estimates to make forecasts. These forecasts affect the behavior of the economy through equation (38).

Agents’ perceived low of motion is

$$X_t = M X_{t-1} + H + \Sigma_t = \Omega Z_{t-1} + \Sigma_t. \quad (48)$$

The forecasts agents make use the estimates of this PLM over available data. Since $X_t$ depends on agents’ forecasts (so it is not available at time $t$ regression) at time $t$ agents have run the regression:

$$E_t X_{t+1} = M_{t-1} X_t + H_{t-1} = \Omega_{t-1} Z_t \quad (49)$$

$$E_{t-1} X_t = M_{t-2} X_{t-1} + H_{t-2} = \Omega_{t-2} Z_{t-1} \quad (50)$$

where now we allow agents to depart from running simply OLS regression (least-squares learning) and use constant gain,

$$R_t = R_{t-1} + \nu_t \left( Z_{t-1} Z'_{t-1} - R_{t-1} \right)$$

$$\Omega_t = \Omega_{t-1} + \nu_t \left( X_t - \Omega_{t-1} Z_{t-1} \right) Z'_{t-1} R_{t-1}^{-1}.$$

Substituting in agents’ expectations, we can write the actual law of motion as

$$X_t = A X_{t-1} + B \left[ M_{t-2} X_{t-1} + H_{t-2} \right] + C \left[ M_{t-1} X_t + H_{t-1} \right] + N + D \xi_t + F \psi_t \quad (51)$$
or

\[ X_t = \left[ I - CM_{t-1} \right]^{-1} [A + BM_{t-2}] + \left[ I - CM_{t-1} \right]^{-1} [CH_{t-1} + BH_{t-2} + N] \]

\[ + \left[ I - CM_{t-1} \right]^{-1} [D\xi_t + F\psi_t] \]  

(52)

There is a mapping \( \{M, H\} = T(M, H) \) from PLM to ALM,

\[ T_M(M, H) = \left[ I - CM \right]^{-1} [A + BM] \]  

(53)

\[ T_H(M, H) = \left[ I - CM \right]^{-1} [BH + CH + N]. \]  

(54)

Rational expectations equilibrium is a fixed-point of this mapping:

\[ M^{re} = \left[ I - CM^{re} \right]^{-1} [A + BM^{re}] . \]  

(55)

Conditional on \( M^{re} \) we can solve for \( H^{re} \):

\[ H^{re} = \left[ I - \left[ I - CM^{re} \right]^{-1} (B + C) \right]^{-1} \left[ I - CM^{re} \right]^{-1} N. \]  

(56)
References


